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COMPLEX LEGAL FRAMEWORKS AND COMPLEX 
OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES: NAVIGATING THE 
APPLICABLE LAW ACROSS THE CONTINUUM OF 
MILITARY OPERATIONS 
Laurie R. Blank* 
Modern conflicts and stability operations pose complex challenges for both 
military and civilian actors tasked with promoting the rule of law during 
conflicts and stability operations. Military operations can occur both during 
armed conflict and in situations that do not qualify as armed conflict, such as 
disaster relief or humanitarian intervention.1 The now oft-used term “stability 
operations” encompasses U.S. military activities conducted “outside the United 
States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or 
reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental 
services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”2 
The legal classification of a particular situation, including non-conflict 
situations, determines which law governs the actions, rights, and obligations of 
those involved. The continuum of conflict ranges from domestic disorders to 
non-international armed conflicts to international armed conflicts, including 
belligerent occupation. Other situations involving the use of military force or 
military capabilities may include counter-piracy or counterterrorism 
operations, disaster relief, or humanitarian assistance. In addition, conflicts 
sometimes involve elements of both international and non-international armed 
conflict and often evolve from one form of conflict into another. The 
emergence of new forms of conflict, for which there may be no ready 
characterization, complicates matters. For example, acts of transnational 
terrorism could constitute an international armed conflict, a non-international 
armed conflict, a law enforcement operation, or, perhaps, a new category of 
conflict. Indeed, stability operations occur across the spectrum of military 
operations, within the context of international armed conflict, non-international 
 
 * Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory University School of Law. 
 1 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 401–409 (2006); S. REP. NO. 109-322, at 467–550 (2006). 
 2 DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-07: STABILITY OPERATIONS, at vi (2008), http://downloads. 
army.mil/docs/FM_3-07.pdf [hereinafter STABILITY OPERATIONS] (quoting JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT 
PUBLICATION 3-0: DOCTRINE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS, at xxi (2001), http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/doctrine/genesis_ 
and_evolution/source_materials/dod_joint_ops_doctrine.pdf). 
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armed conflict, and non-conflict situations. Such operations thus involve 
multiple legal frameworks, including international humanitarian law, human 
rights law, and the domestic law of both the territorial state and the state 
sending troops, as well as, perhaps, a United Nations (“UN”) mandate and 
bilateral or multilateral treaties, or additional layers such as joint operations 
doctrine. 
Understanding how these various legal regimes interact in practice on the 
ground is a challenging task and is fundamental to promoting the rule of law in 
conflict and post-conflict environments.3 For example, uncertainty about the 
applicable law can impact a range of determinations including, among others, 
detention regimes, targeting, and the parameters of the authority and 
responsibility for conducting operations. Identifying the applicable law in a 
conflict or during a stability operation is thus an essential first step that enables 
both military and civilian actors to define their engagement in any international 
intervention. 
This challenge is often compounded when states involved in a conflict or 
military operation do not explicitly characterize it, or when coalition partners 
have conflicting views as to its characterization. For example, the United 
States chose not to characterize its operation in Panama as an armed conflict.4 
Instead, the United States described its operation—one that involved the 
deployment of approximately 30,000 U.S. troops and extensive hostilities 
between U.S. and Panamanian forces—as assistance to the legitimate 
 
 3 This Article grew out of the discussions at the pilot meeting of Mind the Gap: Assessing the 
Applicable Law Across the Continuum of Conflict, a project initiated by the International Humanitarian Law 
Clinic at Emory University School of Law, with the support of the U.S. Institute of Peace. The project has 
been renamed Rules of War and Tools of War; the Author is the Project Director; Project Co-Chairs are 
Professor Michael N. Schmitt, Chair, International Law Department, Naval War College; and Professor Amos 
N. Guiora, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. The project brought together leading practitioners 
and scholars with operational and legal experience in a range of conflicts and peace and stability operations for 
a two-day meeting in September 2010. In particular, the expert group focused on: (1) identifying the key legal 
questions that arise over the continuum of conflict scenarios; (2) assessing whether and how problems in 
defining the conflict situation and identifying applicable legal regimes complicate effective and legal 
interventions; (3) determining which relevant materials and products would be most useful for military and 
civilian actors on the ground; (4) addressing how to better train key actors in this regard; and (5) developing a 
framework for better analyzing the key questions and dilemmas identified. The Author is grateful to the 
participants at the initial pilot meeting for their insights on these issues and, in particular, would like to thank 
Benjamin R. Farley, J.D., Emory University School of Law (2011), for his excellent research assistance and 
contributions to the discussion and the preparation of this Article. 
 4 United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 794–95 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Geoffrey S. Corn & Sharon G. 
Finegan, America’s Longest Held Prisoner of War: Lessons Learned from the Capture, Prosecution, and 
Extradition of General Manuel Noriega, 71 LA. L. REV. 1111, 1117 (2011). 
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government of Panama (although it applied the law of armed conflict as a 
matter of policy).5 Alternatively, while the United States has declared that it is 
in an armed conflict in Afghanistan with both the Taliban and al Qaeda, 
coalition partners such as Germany remained reluctant, until recently, to 
characterize their involvement under the aegis of the International Security 
Assistance Force (“ISAF”) as an armed conflict.6 Thus, even within the same 
coalition, some nations would not apply the same legal framework to their 
activities, creating differing interpretations of rights and obligations. 
Although international law provides a framework—albeit more or less clear 
depending on the situation—for the characterization of conflict and non-
conflict situations, other factors will often come into play from the perspective 
of a particular state. For example, characterization of conflict impacts cohesion 
among coalition partners, the nature of contemporary operations, and the 
linkage between tactics and broader policy issues and choices. A range of 
background issues will also be relevant, such as the connection between law 
and policy, the process by which law is made, and the role of law in the 
policymaking process. For some observers, the lack of or uncertain 
characterization of a conflict up front may be seen as the direct cause of 
numerous legal and policy challenges; for others, it is an inherent aspect of the 
law and decision-making process, and is symptomatic of the tensions between 
strategic-level policymaking and tactical-level operational decision-making. 
Nonetheless, although the choice not to characterize a military operation does 
afford policymakers a great deal of flexibility—a valid and advantageous goal 
that allows them to tailor operations to particular needs—characterization of 
conflicts matters from a legal perspective—it makes a difference normatively 
and not just on a policy level. 
This Article analyzes the impact of differing legal characterizations, or a 
lack of characterization altogether, in complex conflict situations. Amid the 
complicated set of considerations that contribute to conflict characterization, 
the interaction of different applicable legal frameworks poses several key 
issues that policymakers and military and civilian decision-makers should 
 
 5 Noriega, 808 F. Supp. at 795; Corn & Finegan, supra note 4, at 1117–18. 
 6 See Timo Noetzel, Germany’s Small War in Afghanistan: Military Learning amid Politico-Strategic 
Inertia, 31 CONTEMP. SECURITY POL’Y 486, 487 (2010) (“Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, speaking 
explicitly as a representative of the government as a whole, announced before the Bundestag that Germany 
now considered the conflict in all of Afghanistan, and thus including the northern part of the country, an 
‘armed conflict in terms of international humanitarian law.’”) (quoting Guido Westerwelle, Foreign Minister, 
Address at the Bundestag (Feb. 10, 2010), available at http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/ 
Presse/Reden/2010/100210-BM-BT-Afghanistan.html). 
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consider and weigh seriously. Part I provides a brief background of the legal 
framework for conflict characterization and highlights some additional policy 
and strategic considerations as a framework for the primary analysis of the 
overlapping legal frameworks. Part II presents four main categories of 
operational concepts that can be particularly vulnerable to uncertain conflict 
characterizations and highlights the legal fault lines that may result from such 
ambiguity or uncertainty. The first category, detainee issues, includes 
detention, treatment, transfer, and trial. The second category, use of force, 
encompasses targeting, weapons, and host nation influence on operations. In 
the third category, civil–military relations, the primary issues include 
humanitarian assistance and relations between the military and 
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”); and the fourth category focuses on 
third state responsibilities during conflict and related situations. In all of these 
areas, operational challenges can arise in the face of uncertain or differing 
characterizations of conflict, underscoring the importance of the normative 
legal frameworks and the need to understand how they interact, and the 
consequences of any legal fault lines. 
I. BACKGROUND: SETTING THE LEGAL, POLICY, AND STRATEGIC SCENE 
A. Conflict Characterization in Brief 
Distinguishing between situations of armed conflict and situations not 
categorized as armed conflict is essential to understanding the rights, 
privileges, and obligations of states, non-state entities, NGOs, and individuals 
in both situations. At the most basic level, the rights and duties associated with 
war—such as the right to attack and kill enemy operatives or the right to detain 
such persons without charge or trial until the end of hostilities—may only be 
invoked during periods of armed conflict.7 As noted above, however, states 
will often engage in military operations (broadly defined) outside of armed 
conflict, whether in situations that do not rise to the level of armed conflict or 
in situations such as disaster relief or humanitarian assistance. In the absence 
of armed conflict, international human rights law and domestic law govern the 
conduct of states and individuals and set out their relevant rights, privileges, 
 
 7 See Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Study on Targeted Killings, at 10, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston); Laurie R. Blank, Defining the Battlefield in 
Contemporary Conflict and Counterterrorism: Understanding the Parameters of the Zone of Combat, 39 GA. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 30 (2011). 
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and duties. It is important to note that international human rights law and 
domestic law continue to apply even during armed conflict; there is a 
continuing debate about the extent and content of that application in different 
types of situations.8 The contours of that debate lie beyond the scope of this 
Article, but it is important, especially for the purposes of the instant analysis, 
to recognize the existence of multiple legal frameworks in a variety of conflict 
and non-conflict situations. 
The law of armed conflict (“LOAC”)—otherwise known as the law of war 
or international humanitarian law—governs the conduct of both states and 
individuals during armed conflict, and it seeks to minimize suffering in war by 
protecting persons not participating in hostilities and by restricting the means 
and methods of warfare.9 The 1949 Geneva Conventions endeavor to 
encompass all instances of armed conflict10 and set forth two primary 
categories of armed conflict that trigger the application of LOAC: international 
armed conflict and non-international armed conflict. Common Article 2 of the 
Geneva Conventions states that the conventions “shall apply to all cases of 
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or 
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized 
by one of them.”11 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions sets forth 
 
 8 Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, supra note 7, at 9–12, 10 n.53. 
 9 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], International Humanitarian Law: Answers to Your Questions, 
at 4, Pub. Ref. No. 0703 (2002), available at http://www.ehl.icrc.org/images/stories/resources/ihl_answers_to_ 
your_questions.pdf. The law of armed conflict is codified primarily in the four Geneva Conventions of August 
12, 1949 and their Additional Protocols. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter GC IV]; Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316 [hereinafter GC III]; Geneva Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217 [hereinafter GC II]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114 [hereinafter GC I]. 
 10 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION (IV) RELATIVE TO THE 
PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 26 (Oscar M. Uhler & Henri Coursier eds., 1958) 
[hereinafter GC IV COMMENTARY] (“Born on the battlefield, the Red Cross called into being the First Geneva 
Convention to protect wounded or sick military personnel. Extending its solicitude little by little over other 
categories of war victims, in logical application of its fundamental principle, it pointed the way, first to the 
revision of the original Convention, and then to the extension of legal protection in turn to prisoners of war and 
civilians. The same logical process could not fail to lead to the idea of applying the principle in all cases of 
armed conflict, including internal ones.”). 
 11 GC IV, supra note 9, art. 2; GC III, supra note 9, art. 2; GC II, supra note 9, art. 2; GC I, supra note 9, 
art. 2 [collectively hereinafter Common Article 2]. 
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minimum provisions applicable “[i]n the case of armed conflict not of an 
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting 
Parties.”12 The term “armed conflict” was adopted specifically to avoid the 
technical legal and political pitfalls of the term “war” and prevent states from 
claiming that the law does not apply because no declaration of war has been 
issued.13 As such, determination of the existence of an armed conflict does not 
turn on a formal declaration of war or even on how the participants 
characterize the hostilities, but rather is based on the facts of a given 
situation.14 
The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) set forth the contemporary definition of armed conflict 
in Prosecutor v. Tadic.15 The ICTY held that an armed conflict exists 
whenever “there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed 
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or 
between such groups within a State.”16 The first portion of the definition refers 
to international armed conflict; the second to non-international armed conflict. 
A thorough analysis of the definition of armed conflict and the objective 
triggers for the existence of either an international armed conflict or a non-
international armed conflict is beyond the scope of this Article. The purpose in 
this brief background section is to set forth the basic framework of when 
LOAC is triggered and the distinction between international and non-
international armed conflict. LOAC applies during all situations of armed 
conflict, with the full panoply of the Geneva Conventions and customary law 
applicable in international armed conflict and a more limited body of 
conventional and customary law applicable during non-international armed 
conflict.17 
International armed conflict occurs when there is any conflict between two 
states. Neither the duration of the hostilities, the intensity of any fighting, nor 
 
 12 GC IV, supra note 9, art. 3; GC III, supra note 9, art. 3; GC II, supra note 9, art. 3; GC I, supra note 9, 
art. 3 [collectively hereinafter Common Article 3]. 
 13 See generally GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 17–25 (addressing Common Article 2). 
 14 Anthony Cullen, Key Developments Affecting the Scope of Internal Armed Conflict in International 
Humanitarian Law, 183 MIL. L. REV. 66, 85 (2005) (“[I]t is worth emphasizing that recognition of the 
existence of armed conflict is not a matter of state discretion.”); Sylvain Vite, Typology of Armed Conflicts in 
International Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 69, 72 (2009). 
 15 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 16 Id. ¶ 70. 
 17 Id. ¶¶ 67, 70. 
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the number of wounded or killed affects the characterization as an armed 
conflict. Rather, as the Commentary to the Geneva Conventions explains, 
“[a]ny difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of 
armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one 
of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war.”18 
Non-international armed conflicts present a more complex identification 
paradigm than international armed conflicts. In general, non-international 
armed conflicts involve protracted armed violence between a government and 
organized armed groups or between two or more such groups.19 Treaty 
provisions do not specify any particular test for determining the applicability of 
Common Article 3. Instead, as the Commentary explains, the goal is to 
interpret Common Article 3 as broadly as possibly.20 In identifying non-
international armed conflict, the law seeks to “distinguish[] armed conflict 
from banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities, 
which are not subject to international humanitarian law.”21 For example, the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights characterized a short-lived 
attack on a military barracks as a non-international armed conflict because of 
“the concerted nature of the hostile acts undertaken by the attackers, the direct 
involvement of governmental armed forces, and the nature and level of the 
violence.”22 Some factors or characteristics that are useful in identifying a 
Common Article 3 conflict include the response of the state,23 such as whether 
it employs its regular armed forces and whether it has recognized the non-state 
actor as a belligerent, and the capability of the non-state actor, such as whether 
it has an organized military force under a responsible command and whether it 
 
 18 GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 20. Note that because all states are parties to the Geneva 
Conventions, the requirement in Common Article 2 that an international armed conflict be a dispute between 
two High Contracting Parties is akin to a dispute between two states. 
 19 Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, ¶ 70. 
 20 GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 36 (“Does this mean that Article 3 is not applicable in cases 
where armed strife breaks out in a country, but does not fulfill any of [the suggested criteria]? We do not 
subscribe to this view. We think, on the contrary, that the scope of application of the article must be as wide as 
possible.”). 
 21 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 562 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
July 15, 1999). Government forces are presumed to be sufficiently organized to be a party to an armed conflict. 
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgement, ¶ 60 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Apr. 3, 2008). 
 22 Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 
doc. 6 rev. ¶ 155 (1997), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/97eng/Argentina11137.htm#_ftn1 
(“[P]articularly, the attackers involved carefully planned, coordinated and executed an armed attack, i.e., a 
military operation, against a quintessential military objective—a military base.”). 
 23 Geoffrey S. Corn, What Law Applies to the War on Terror?, in THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS 
OF WAR: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 1, 17 (Michael W. Lewis ed., 2009). 
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acts as a de facto governing entity within a determinate territory.24 In 
particular, courts and tribunals have focused on two primary considerations: 
“the intensity of the conflict and the organization of the parties to the 
conflict.”25 Intensity looks at the seriousness of the fighting to determine 
whether it has passed from riots and other somewhat random acts of violence 
to something more akin to regularized military action. Courts look to a non-
state party’s level of organization as one way to distinguish armed conflict 
from unorganized violence and riots, and consider factors such as hierarchical 
structure, territorial control and administration, the ability to recruit and train 
combatants, the ability to launch operations making use of military tactics, and 
the ability to enter peace or cease-fire agreements.26 
B. Policy Considerations 
Characterization of conflict has broader policy and strategic-level 
consequences as well, beyond the legal paradigms. Although flexibility at the 
policymaking level is understandably desirable from a policy standpoint, it 
may result in uncertainty and ambiguity for military and civilian actors 
executing the missions. When the legal framework—which sets forth each 
party’s rights and obligations—is unclear, the operational challenges multiply 
exponentially. Beyond the immediate challenges on the ground, these 
ambiguities create two additional problems. First, ad hoc answers to 
operational challenges may not be readily transferable to the next operation, 
leaving operators in the unfortunate position of having to readdress challenges 
and redevelop solutions already faced by their predecessors elsewhere. Second, 
military and civilian actors will often be left in an uncertain position with 
respect to their local counterparts, particularly regarding the appropriate 
parameters for providing advice or counsel, or performing a mentoring role. 
Two other important issues arise beyond these significant tactical and 
operational level concerns. One common response to the question of uncertain 
 
 24 GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 35–36. None of these factors is dispositive; rather, these and 
other factors may be used to distinguish acts of banditry, short-lived insurrection, or terrorist acts from armed 
conflict. Cases apply different and overlapping factors to determine whether an armed conflict existed. See, 
e.g., Prosecutor v. Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 879–88 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia July 20, 2009); Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, ¶ 49; Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, 
Judgement, ¶ 84 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005); Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 
¶¶ 562–67; Vite, supra note 18, at 76–78. 
 25 Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, ¶ 562. 
 26 Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, ¶ 60; see also Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, ¶ 884; Limaj, Case No. 
IT-03-66-T, ¶¶ 95–109. 
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characterization is that it is U.S. policy to apply the full panoply of LOAC in 
all military operations—to apply the law applicable in international armed 
conflict to all situations. Department of Defense Directive 2311.01E thus states 
that “[m]embers of the [Department of Defense] Components comply with the 
law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are 
characterized, and in all other military operations.”27 This policy minimizes 
confusion on the ground, creates a standard set of rules, provides for training 
without the ambiguities of multiple legal frameworks, and generally facilitates 
certainty of action for troops and commanders. This approach clearly has great 
value. However, when considering whether the lack of or conflicting 
characterizations has an impact on military operations, the across-the-board 
policy approach also can have two primary and problematic consequences in 
complex stability operations and conflict—consequences that policymakers 
should understand, explore, and consider. 
The first is an issue of limitation, the second of obligation. As stated above, 
it is U.S. policy that all situations be viewed as triggering the obligations of the 
law applicable to international armed conflict and U.S. troops are trained 
accordingly. While this approach does create certainty, it also means that in 
complex conflict and stability operations, military leaders and junior and senior 
commanders may forfeit opportunities to craft more specific solutions and 
options appropriate to the situation on the ground. In essence, when U.S. 
policy is to follow the law of international armed conflict unless told 
otherwise, identifying the “unless told otherwise” times is a critical task to 
tease out the different types of options available to military and civilian leaders 
and operators on the ground. The flip side of this first concern is that by 
treating all situations—from a normative legal perspective—as international 
armed conflict, commanders and soldiers may find themselves in situations in 
which, by following the law of international armed conflict, they could actually 
be in violation of human rights and other legal obligations applicable in the 
internal conflict or other emergency situation at hand. 
II. OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES AND LEGAL FAULT LINES 
In many contemporary conflicts, the complicated nature of the situation on 
the ground leads to overlapping legal frameworks, uncertain or conflicting 
characterizations, and other factors that pose challenges for the analysis of 
 
 27 DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 2311.01E: DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM ¶ 4.1 (2011), available at http:// 
www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/231101e.pdf. 
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legal operational obligations and parameters. This Article focuses on four areas 
in which legal obligations and issues can prove particularly vulnerable to 
uncertain conflict characterization and thus highlight the legal fault lines at 
issue: detainee issues, use of force, civil–military relations, and third state 
responsibilities. In each of these areas, uncertainty regarding the applicable 
legal framework can create ambiguities because the legal obligations and 
parameters differ depending on the characterization of the conflict or situation. 
When these ambiguities produce uneven, delayed, or ineffective 
implementation of legal obligations, protections for individuals can be 
affected. Other concerns involve the legitimacy of particular operations and the 
effective accomplishment of a designated mission. Beyond the tactical and 
operational ambiguities, each of these areas also raises concerns about the 
forfeiting of opportunities to craft responses specific to the situation on the 
ground and the potential for violations of other legal obligations. This Part 
outlines the key legal frameworks in each of these areas to highlight the 
operational challenges that can arise, in essence, to frame the normative issues 
and differences that make characterization matter on the policy and strategic 
levels, and not just in the lawyer’s office. 
A. Detainee Issues 
International humanitarian law provides the legal framework for detention 
in both international and non-international armed conflicts.28 Human rights law 
continues to apply across the spectrum of conflict as well, in varying ways. In 
non-conflict scenarios, the domestic law of the host state regulates detention, 
with human rights law providing minimum standards of conduct.29 In any or all 
of the situations, UN mandates, bilateral agreements, and other legal 
frameworks can play an important role as well. This Subpart encompasses four 
particular areas: detention authority, treatment of detainees, trial, and transfer. 
The legal understanding of the military operation—characterization as either 
international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict, or not a 
conflict—impacts the parameters and term of the detention, the relevant 
international humanitarian law and human rights norms applicable upon 
transfer, procedures for review and prosecution, and other issues. 
 
 28 GC III, supra note 9, arts. 4–5; GC IV, supra note 9, arts. 42, 78. In non-international armed conflict, 
the authority to detain stems directly from the principle of military necessity and is a fundamental incident of 
waging war. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 552–53 (2004); Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, supra note 10, at 9. 
 29 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 99 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (defining minimum human rights standards for detention). 
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1. Detention Authority 
Detention authority and obligations can differ depending on the 
characterization of any given scenario in five key areas: the basis for detention; 
procedural requirements for detention; the conditions of detainee release; 
outside monitoring of detention; and detainee contact with the outside world. 
Although fundamental notions of respect for human dignity underlie the 
parameters for detention in any legal regime, international or domestic, the 
precise content of the legal rights and obligations do differ between 
international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict, and non-conflict 
situations. As a result, uncertainty about the governing legal paradigm can lead 
to ambiguity or confusion regarding the appropriate approach. 
a. Basis for Detention 
In an international armed conflict or occupation, LOAC provides for the 
detention of combatants and of civilians who either participate in hostilities or 
pose a threat to the security of the occupying power.30 Prisoners of war 
(“POWs”) may be detained for the duration of hostilities and must be 
repatriated at the close of hostilities.31 Under the POW detention regime in the 
Third Geneva Convention and earlier customary and conventional law, 
preventing a return to hostilities is the underlying purpose of detention.32 In 
particular, POWs are not liable to prosecution for their lawful wartime acts, 
which reinforces the fact that they are not held as a form of punishment for 
engaging in combat.33 Historical and modern incarnations of law of war 
detention rest on this notion. As the Lieber Code stated, in one of the earliest 
codifications of the modern law of war, “So soon as a man is armed by a 
sovereign government, and takes the soldier’s oath of fidelity, he is a 
belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts, are not individual 
 
 30 GC IV, supra note 9, art. 5. 
 31 GC III, supra note 9, art. 118. 
 32 In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946) (“The object of capture is to prevent the captured 
individual from serving the enemy. He is disarmed and from then on he must be removed as completely as 
practicable from the front, treated humanely and in time exchanged, repatriated or otherwise released.”). 
 33 United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 553 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“Lawful combatant immunity, a 
doctrine rooted in the customary international law of war, forbids prosecution of soldiers for their lawful 
belligerent acts committed during the course of armed conflicts against legitimate military targets. Belligerent 
acts committed in armed conflict by enemy members of the armed forces may be punished as crimes under a 
belligerent’s municipal law only to the extent that they violate international humanitarian law or are unrelated 
to the armed conflict. This doctrine has a long history, which is reflected in part in various early international 
conventions, statutes and documents.”); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 30–31 (2004); see also GC III, supra note 9, arts. 87, 99. 
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crimes or offences.”34 The Nuremberg Tribunal similarly upheld this purpose 
for POW detention.35 
Persons who do not qualify for POW status can nonetheless be detained 
during international armed conflict as well. The Fourth Geneva Convention 
explicitly contemplates the detention of civilians during international armed 
conflict “only if the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely 
necessary,”36 or during belligerent occupation for “imperative reasons of 
security.”37 The Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention offers some 
further explanation about the nature of imperative reasons of security: 
[A] belligerent may intern people . . . if it has serious and legitimate 
reason to think that they are members of organizations whose object 
is to cause disturbances, or that they may seriously prejudice its 
security by other means, such as sabotage or espionage. . . . [T]he 
State must have good reason to think that the person concerned, by 
his activities, knowledge or qualifications, represents a real threat to 
its present or future security.38 
In particular, the mere fact that an individual is an enemy national is not 
sufficient to justify such internment; rather, any detention must be based on an 
individualized determination of the threat to security the individual poses.39 
For example, “[s]ubversive activity carried on inside the territory of a Party to 
 
 34 FRANCIS LIEBER, WAR DEP’T, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED 
STATES IN THE FIELD ¶ 57 (1863) [hereinafter Lieber Code]. 
 35 Judgment, 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 
171 (1947), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 229 (1947); see also TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND 
VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 19 (1970) (“War consists largely of acts that would be criminal if 
performed in time of peace. . . . Such conduct is not regarded as criminal if it takes place in the course of war, 
because the state of war lays a blanket of immunity over the warriors.”); Yasmin Naqvi, Doubtful Prisoner-of-
War Status, 84 INT’L. REV. RED CROSS 571, 572 (2002). 
 36 GC IV, supra note 9, art. 42. 
 37 Id. art. 78; see also id. art. 5 (referring to individuals who are “definitely suspected of or engaged in 
activities hostile to the security of the State”); Ashley S. Deeks, Security Detention: The International Legal 
Framework: Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 403, 404 (2009) 
(describing “situations in which states engaged in armed conflict may detain persons” without criminal 
charges). 
 38 GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 257–58. 
 39 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 9.31 (2004) 
[hereinafter U.K. MANUAL]; Deeks, supra note 37, at 407 (“Embedded in these rules is the unstated 
requirement that a person must be detained based on the particularities of his situation. For instance, a state 
may not detain a person for something his neighbor has done, or use a person as a bargaining chip to obtain the 
release of a detainee held by the opposing state.”); Ryan Goodman, The Second Annual Solf–Warren Lecture 
in International and Operational Law, 201 MIL. L. REV. 237, 245 (2009). 
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the conflict or actions which are of direct assistance to an enemy Power” fit 
within this framework.40 
Civilian internees during international armed conflict or occupation are 
detainable for only as long as the reasons underlying the initial detention 
persist,41 at which time they are to be returned to their place of residence at the 
time of their detention, or, if they were in transit when detained, to their point 
of departure.42 For example, the UN Security Council Resolution governing 
the activities of the Multi-National Force-Iraq authorized the coalition forces to 
“take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and 
stability in Iraq,”43 including “internment where . . . necessary for imperative 
reasons of security.”44 The primary recourse a detaining power has in such 
circumstances is to assigned residence or internment, and only if security 
reasons make such measures absolutely necessary.45 The rules governing such 
internment bear a marked similarity to many of the rules for POW detention, 
including the obligation to ensure that internment camps are not exposed to the 
dangers of war.46 
In situations of non-international armed conflict, Common Article 3 clearly 
contemplates detention of one or more forms, referencing individuals who are 
hors de combat because of detention, among other reasons.47 However, no 
specific provision in LOAC delineates authority for detention in internal armed 
conflict, where POW status does not exist. Military necessity thus forms the 
foundation for detention pursuant to LOAC in such conflicts.48 In essence, it is 
 
 40 GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 258; Goodman, supra note 39, at 245–46. 
 41 GC IV, supra note 9, arts. 132–33 (“Internees in the territory of Party to the conflict against whom 
penal proceedings are pending . . . may be detained until the close of such proceedings.”). 
 42 Id. art. 135. 
 43 S.C. Res. 1546, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004); see also Public Notice, Office of the 
Adm’r of the Coal. Provisional Auth., Regarding Public Incitement to Violence and Disorder (June 5, 2003), 
available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/cpa/english/regulations/PN1.pdf (announcing that all individuals 
engaged in public incitement to violence and disorder “will be subject to immediate detention by CPA security 
forces and held as security internee[s] under the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949”). 
 44 S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 43, Annex I, at 11. For a comprehensive discussion of security detention in 
Iraq, see Robert M. Chesney, Iraq and the Military Detention Debate: Firsthand Perspectives from the Other 
War, 2003-2010, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 549 (2011). 
 45 GV IV, supra note 9, art. 78. 
 46 GC III, supra note 9, art. 43. For further discussion of the specific rules governing internment of 
civilians and the similarities to POW detention, see U.K. MANUAL, supra note 39, ¶¶ 9.37–.86. 
 47 Common Article 3, supra note 12 (“Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members 
of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, 
detention, or any other cause”). 
 48 See R (Al Jedda) v. Sec’y of State for Defence, [2008] 1 A.C. 332, 368 (2006) (U.K.) (holding that the 
power to detain is implicit in customary LOAC); CHATHAM HOUSE & INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
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generally recognized that anyone who may be lawfully targeted in internal 
armed conflict may likewise be detained49: notably, members of organized 
armed groups and civilians directly participating in hostilities. Domestic law 
will often serve as the basis for detention in non-international armed conflict, 
for crimes such as murder and treason. Furthermore, the fact that international 
law provides safeguards for persons detained in such conflicts suggests that it 
contemplates that operations in internal armed conflict do include the authority 
to detain. 
Beyond authority found in LOAC and domestic law, detention during 
armed conflict can also rest on authorization in relevant UN Security Council 
resolutions. In particular, UN Security Council resolutions authorized 
detention as part of multinational operations in Kosovo and Iraq.50 For 
example, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 stated that the international 
security force’s responsibilities in Kosovo would include “[e]nsuring public 
safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for 
this task.”51 This mission to ensure public safety was understood to provide a 
basis for the multinational force to undertake detention. As a NATO press 
release at the time explained, one “necessary means” for maintaining security 
and law and order “may be the detention of individuals who pose a threat to the 
safe and secure environment in Kosovo. Such detentions are fully compliant 
with international law, are used sparingly and will last for only as long as is 
absolutely necessary.”52 Similarly, UN Security Council Resolution 1546 
expressly authorized the multinational force in Iraq to “take all necessary 
measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.”53 
In Iraq, detention authority was specifically linked to that provided in the 
 
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS FOR SECURITY DETENTION IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 5–6 (2008) 
[hereinafter CHATHAM HOUSE]; Geoffrey S. Corn, The Problem with Law Avoidance, NAT’L SECURITY L. REP. 
(Am. Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on Law & Nat’l Sec., Chi., Ill.), Winter 2010, at 4, 6. 
 49 See infra Part II.B. 
 50 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999) (providing a mission to ensure 
public safety and order that was interpreted to provide a basis for detention in Kosovo); S.C. Res. 1546, supra 
note 43, Annex I, at 11 (stating that, in order to counter ongoing security threats, the multinational force will 
intern individuals where necessary for imperative reasons of security). 
 51 S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 50, ¶ 9(d). 
 52 Press Release, Kosovo Force, DFOR Detention Under UNSCR 1244 (May 5, 2004), available at 
http://www.nato.int/kfor/docu/pr/2004/05/28.htm; see also Behrami v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007), ¶ 124, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/Homepage_EN (follow “Case- Law” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” 
hyperlink; then search by placing “Behrami” in the “Case Title” box and “France” in the “Respondent State” 
box). 
 53 S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 43, ¶ 10. 
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Fourth Geneva Convention: “necessary for imperative reasons of security.”54 
In Afghanistan, ISAF detention authority is considered to stem from UN 
Security Council Resolution 1833, which directs ISAF “to take all necessary 
measures to fulfill its mandate,”55 but does not specifically authorize detention. 
In non-conflict situations, much like in non-international armed conflict, 
domestic law and international human rights law provide the framework for 
detention. Among other requirements, human rights norms require that 
detention be grounded in previously established law, that the detainee be 
informed of the reasons for his detention, and that all detention be subject to 
judicial review.56 
b. Procedural Requirements 
LOAC mandates basic procedural requirements for the detention of 
individuals within the context of an international armed conflict or occupation. 
In the case of persons potentially entitled to POW status, Article 5 of the Third 
Geneva Convention states that if “any doubt arise[s] as to whether persons, 
having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the 
enemy, [merit POW status], such persons shall enjoy the protection of the 
present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a 
competent tribunal.”57 For those persons where POW status is clear, such as 
soldiers captured in uniform, no such status hearing is required, because there 
is no doubt regarding status.58 For others, this obligation helps ensure that 
persons are granted the appropriate treatment and classification under the law. 
It also helps fulfill one spirit and purpose behind the Geneva Conventions 
framework that all detainees must have some status, either as a POW or as a 
civilian internee: 
Every person in enemy hands must have some status under 
international law: he is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered 
by the Third Convention, a civilian covered by the Fourth 
Convention, or again, a member of the medical personnel of the 
 
 54 See id., Annex I, at 11. 
 55 S.C. Res. 1833, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1833 (Sept. 22, 2008). 
 56 See ICCPR, supra note 29, arts. 9(1)–(4). This is also true in situations of occupation for the detention 
of civilians who violate ordinary penal law. See GC IV, supra note 9, arts. 67, 71–73. 
 57 GC III, supra note 9, art. 5. 
 58 See id. arts. 4–5. 
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armed forces who is covered by the First Convention. There is no 
intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law.59 
LOAC contains no specific procedural requirements for Article 5 tribunals 
other than the general statement that such hearings must be held by a 
“competent tribunal.”60 It is generally understood that Article 5 hearings “were 
not envisaged as judicial bodies obliged to comply with fair trial guarantees” 
but can be significantly less formal and organized.61 Detaining powers mandate 
the particular procedural framework, which can and will differ depending on 
the location, nature of the conflict, number of detainees, and other factors.62 
One example of such procedures can be found in the guidance provided by 
U.S. Central Command to Army units during the 1991 Gulf War, which 
defined a tribunal as a “panel of three commissioned officers, at least one of 
whom must be a judge advocate, convened to make determinations of fact 
pursuant to GPW Article 5.”63 In the United Kingdom, Article 5 tribunals are 
governed by the 1958 Prisoner of War Determination of Status Regulations,64 
according to which a competent tribunal “consists of a board of inquiry which 
makes a report that constitutes the effective determination of the status of the 
person concerned.”65 
In the case of civilians detained during international armed conflict or 
occupation, the Fourth Geneva Convention sets forth procedural requirements 
and protections. Article 43 mandates that “[a]ny protected person who has 
been interned or placed in assigned residence shall be entitled to have such 
action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or 
administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose.”66 
Any such court or administrative board must review the case at least twice 
 
 59 GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 51. 
 60 GC III, supra note 9, art. 5. 
 61 Jelena Pejic, Unlawful/Enemy Combatants, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: 
EXPLORING THE FAULT LINES 335, 336 (Michael N. Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007). 
 62 Id. 
 63 U.S. CENT. COMMAND, REGULATION NUMBER 27-13, CAPTURED PERSONS: DETERMINATION OF 
ELIGIBILITY FOR ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR STATUS ¶ 5(k) (1995), available at http://www.aclu.org/ 
torturefoia/legaldocuments/july_docs/(G)%20%20MISCELLANEOUS%20BATCH%201.pdf. The regulation 
set forth the powers of the tribunal, including calling witnesses, determining the mental and physical capacity 
of the detainee to participate, and requiring or requesting the production of documents, and the rights of the 
detainee during the proceeding. Id. app. C, ¶ 4. 
 64 See U.K. MANUAL, supra note 39, ¶ 8.21. 
 65 Naqvi, supra note 35, at 588 (noting that the regulations include the requirement that detainees be 
represented by a lawyer at the public expense). 
 66 GC IV, supra note 9, art. 43. 
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each year to determine if the individual detained can be released.67 
Furthermore, protected persons detained for imperative reasons of security 
under Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention are entitled to appeal and 
periodic review of their detention.68 The goal of these provisions is to 
minimize opportunities for abuse by ensuring procedures for appeal and 
regular review. As the Fourth Geneva Convention’s Commentary explains, 
[t]he essential point is that protected persons should be absolutely 
free to make their appeals and that the authorities should examine 
them with absolute objectivity and impartiality. They must never 
forget that the Convention describes internment and placing in 
assigned residence as exceptionally severe measures which may be 
applied only if they are absolutely necessary for the security of the 
State.69 
Unlike POWs, therefore, who are held until the end of hostilities without 
review of their detention (except in cases of penal prosecution for crimes 
committed pre-capture or during captivity), civilians detained in the course of 
international armed conflict or occupation have the right to appeal and periodic 
review of their detention.70 Given the extraordinary power enemy or occupying 
forces have over such civilians, such obligations and procedures are critically 
important.71 
Neither conventional nor customary law relating to armed conflicts 
includes any statement regarding the procedural requirements for detention in 
 
 67 Id. 
 68 See id. art. 78 (“Decisions regarding such assigned residence or internment shall be made according to 
a regular procedure to be prescribed by the Occupying Power in accordance with the provisions of the present 
Convention.”). 
 69 GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 260–61. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See, e.g., Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 109/99, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 60 (1999) (stating that the rules authorizing security detention of civilians 
during international armed conflict as an extraordinary measure “require that it be implemented pursuant to a 
regular procedure which enables the detainee to be heard and to appeal the decision ‘with the least possible 
delay’”). In Iraq, for example, the procedures for detention by the multinational force included specific 
procedures for review: 
Detainees in Iraq receive review of their detention every six months. These periodic reviews 
occur in the form of a Multi-National Force Review Committee (MNFRC), a three-officer board 
that assesses the threat posed by each detainee. The MNFRC reads the case summary to the 
detainee at the review. The detainee may make an oral statement to the Committee, may present 
evidence, and may ask questions of witnesses. The Committee informs the detainee of the final 
decision within 45 days of the review. 
Deeks, supra note 37, at 422. 
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non-international armed conflict, particularly administrative detention akin to 
that contemplated in the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I. 
As the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) 
recently noted in reporting on the current state of LOAC, “[t]here are simply 
no procedural safeguards in treaties of humanitarian law to deal with [the 
widespread practice of internment without criminal charge] during non-
international armed conflicts.”72 Notably, Additional Protocol II, which applies 
only to a certain class of non-international armed conflicts and includes 
enhanced protections relative to Common Article 3, makes no mention of 
procedures to be taken at the start of or during detention.73 Rather, such 
detention and any requisite procedures are governed by domestic law,74 which 
may incorporate or be informed by human rights provisions and the due 
process requirements set forth in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”), for example.75 Customary international law 
forbids arbitrary detention in non-international armed conflict.76 These same 
standards—in domestic law and international human rights law—form the 
appropriate paradigm in non-conflict situations as well. 
 
 72 Jakob Kellenberger, President, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Strengthening Legal Protection for 
Victims of Armed Conflicts (Sept. 21, 2010), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/ 
statement/ihl-development-statement-210910.htm. 
 73 Additional Protocol II applies to non-international armed conflicts between a state signatory to the 
Protocol and “dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, 
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations and . . . implement” the Protocol. AP II, supra note 9, art. 1. Article 5 of Additional Protocol II 
provides protections for persons who have been detained, but is silent as to procedures, appeals, or reviews. 
See, e.g., Laura M. Olson, Practical Challenges of Implementing the Complementarity Between International 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law—Demonstrated by the Procedural Regulations of Internment in 
Non-international Armed Conflict, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 437, 442 (2009) (“The Second Additional 
Protocol applicable in non-international armed conflict briefly mentions internment, but provides no guidance 
regarding procedures either to assess the decision to intern or to terminate captivity. Again, Common Article 3 
does not speak to the issue.”). 
 74 Deeks, supra note 37, at 405. It is unclear, however, whether a state engaged in a non-international 
armed conflict in the territory of another state, as is the case for the United States in Afghanistan, may draw 
upon its own domestic law or only the domestic law of the state in which it is operating. See CHATHAM 
HOUSE, supra note 48, at 7. 
 75 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 29, arts. 8–10. Note also that the law of international armed conflict can 
provide useful analogies and guidance for exploring the parameters of detention in non-international armed 
conflict. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 39, at 240–42. 
 76 In the context of a non-international armed conflict, arbitrary means detention of a civilian not 
supported by military necessity or detention of a civilian beyond the existence of the necessity requiring the 
initial detention. See CHATHAM HOUSE, supra note 48, at 4. 
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c. Outside Monitoring 
The law of international armed conflict establishes a framework for 
external monitoring and implementation of the obligations of states. The 
concept of a “protecting power,” which first appeared in a treaty in the 1929 
Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, relies on neutral 
third states to protect the rights and duties of parties to international armed 
conflicts.77 Articles 8 and 9 of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions set 
forth the protecting powers system.78 The ICRC also plays an essential role in 
monitoring the implementation of LOAC during armed conflict, particularly 
with regard to POWs and other detainees. In particular, given that the 
protecting power system has barely, if ever, been used in the years since World 
War II, “[t]he role of the ICRC has taken on an increasing importance in the 
light of the failure of states to appoint protecting powers.”79 
With regard to detention in international armed conflict, Protecting Powers 
and the ICRC “shall have permission to go to all places where prisoners of war 
may be, particularly to places of internment, imprisonment and labour, and 
shall have access to all premises occupied by prisoners of war . . . . [and] be 
able to interview the prisoners, and in particular the prisoners’ 
representatives.”80 Article 143 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides for 
the same rights for Protecting Powers and the ICRC regarding protected 
persons81 detained during the course of international armed conflict.82 In both 
 
 77 See generally George A.B. Peirce, Humanitarian Protection for the Victims of War: The System of 
Protecting Powers and the Role of the ICRC, 90 MIL. L. REV. 89 (1980) (describing the history of the 
protecting power system in both customary and treaty law). 
 78 Respectively, Article 8 of the Third Geneva Convention and Article 9 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention state: 
The present Convention shall be applied with the cooperation and under the scrutiny of the 
Protecting Powers whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of the Parties to the conflict. For this 
purpose, the Protecting Powers may appoint, apart from their diplomatic or consular staff, 
delegates from amongst their own nationals or the nationals of other neutral Powers. The said 
delegates shall be subject to the approval of the Power with which they are to carry out their 
duties. The Parties to the conflict shall facilitate to the greatest extent possible the task of the 
representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers. 
GC IV, supra note 9, art. 9; GC III, supra note 9, art. 8. 
 79 U.K. MANUAL, supra note 39, ¶ 16.13.1. 
 80 GC III, supra note 9, art. 126. 
 81 Protected Persons are a specially defined class of persons in international armed conflict, defined in 
Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention: “Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given 
moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a 
Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.” GC IV, supra note 9, art. 4. 
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situations, detaining powers cannot prohibit visits by Protecting Powers or the 
ICRC except for “reasons of imperative military necessity, and then only as an 
exceptional and temporary measure.”83 
LOAC does not impose any obligations for outside monitoring of 
individuals detained in non-international armed conflicts, but there remains at a 
minimum the recognition that persons should not be held incommunicado.84 
Furthermore, the ICRC has a right to request access to persons detained in such 
conflicts and regularly visits detention centers in a range of countries involved 
in non-international armed conflict.85 In the absence of armed conflict, 
international law does not include any procedures for or obligations to submit 
to outside monitoring of detention. 
d. Conditions of Release 
Consistent with the other facets of detention addressed here, LOAC 
provides significant guidance regarding the conditions of release for POWs 
and civilian internees during international armed conflict, but offers minimal 
guidance regarding the release of detainees in non-international armed conflict. 
A fundamental feature of the POW regime is that POWs must be repatriated as 
soon as possible after the end of active hostilities.86 Once the fighting is over, 
the justification for holding enemy personnel—removing them from the 
battlefield—no longer exists. The Third Geneva Convention then sets forth 
detailed procedures for such repatriation, including the restoration of any 
articles of value to POWs and provisions for POWs to take their personal 
effects with them upon repatriation or have them forwarded.87 For civilians 
interned for imperative reasons of security during occupation or international 
armed conflict, the regime for release includes an additional element. Like 
POWs, civilian internees must be released as soon as possible after the close of 
hostilities. In a clear demonstration of a key difference between POW 
detention and civilian internment, however, the Fourth Geneva Convention 
 
 82 GC IV, supra note 9, art. 143 (“Representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers shall have 
permission to go to all places where protected persons are, particularly to places of internment, detention and 
work. They shall have access to all premises occupied by protected persons and shall be able to interview the 
latter without witnesses, personally or through an interpreter. . . . The delegates of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross shall also enjoy the above prerogatives.”). 
 83 Id.; GC III, supra note 9, art. 126. 
 84 Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 375, 389–90 (2005). 
 85 Id. at 391. 
 86 GC III, supra note 9, art. 118. 
 87 Id. art. 119. 
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also requires that each individual internee be released as soon as the reasons 
necessitating his or her internment have ended, which may be during the 
conflict.88 This rule thus reinforces “that internment may be ordered only if the 
security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary.”89 One final 
provision governing the release of detained persons appears in Additional 
Protocol I: Article 75(3) mandates that  
[e]xcept in cases of arrest of detention for penal offences, [all persons 
arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the armed 
conflict] shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in 
any event as soon as the circumstances justifying the arrest, detention 
or internment have ceased to exist.90  
Recognizing the importance placed on prompt release and repatriation of both 
POWs and civilian internees, the grave breaches provisions of Additional 
Protocol I include an “[u]njustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of 
war or civilians” as a grave breach.91 
In non-international armed conflict, much like in the other areas covered 
here regarding detention, the conventional law offers little, if any, guidance 
regarding conditions of release and repatriation. Although Additional Protocol 
II refers, albeit obliquely, to the release of detained persons in Articles 2(2)92 
and 5(4),93 treaty law governing non-international armed conflict contains no 
specific provisions detailing the timeframe or the obligations relevant to 
release and repatriation. The ICRC’s Customary International Law Study 
includes as customary law the rule that “[p]ersons deprived of their liberty in 
relation to a non-international armed conflict must be released as soon as the 
reasons for the deprivation of their liberty cease to exist,” based on agreements 
 
 88 See GC IV, supra note 9, art. 132. 
 89 GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 510–11. 
 90 AP I, supra note 9, art. 75(3). 
 91 Id. art. 85(4)(b). 
 92 Additional Protocol II dictates: 
At the end of the armed conflict, all the persons who have been deprived of their liberty or whose 
liberty has been restricted for reasons related to such conflict, as well as those deprived of their 
liberty or whose liberty is restricted after the conflict for the same reasons, shall enjoy the 
protection of Articles 5 and 6 until the end of such deprivation or restriction of liberty. 
AP II, supra note 9, art. 2(2). 
 93 Id. art. 5(4) (“If it is decided to release persons deprived of their liberty, necessary measures to ensure 
their safety shall be taken by those so deciding.”). 
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in various internal conflicts, national legislation, and official statements.94 In 
non-conflict situations, again, domestic law—as informed by human rights 
obligations—governs the terms and process for release of detainees. 
e. Contact with the Outside World 
The Geneva Conventions establish a comprehensive framework for POWs 
and civilian internees to communicate with the outside world during 
international armed conflict. In both situations, elaborate rules set forth the 
number and type of correspondence permitted, parameters for censorship, 
obligations regarding postage, and other specifics.95 One significant difference, 
however, is that civilians interned under an occupation may be restrained from 
communicating with the outside world if they are believed to be saboteurs, 
spies, or definitively engaged in hostile acts against the occupying power, and 
military security necessitates such restrictions.96 In light of concerns about the 
potential widespread application of this derogation article, the Commentary to 
the Fourth Geneva Convention emphasizes “that Article 5 can only be applied 
in individual cases of an exceptional nature, when the existence of specific 
charges makes it almost certain that penal proceedings will follow . . . [and 
never] as a result of mere suspicion.”97 
Interestingly, in a departure from the previous categories, the conventional 
law does include at least one statement regarding communication rights of 
detainees during non-international armed conflict. Article 5 of Additional 
Protocol II, which applies only to a certain subset of non-international armed 
conflict,98 states that persons interned or detained for reasons relating to the 
armed conflict “shall be allowed to send and receive letters and cards, the 
number of which may be limited by competent authority if it deems 
necessary.”99 With limits for the capability of the detaining power and 
concerns of necessity, this protection is significantly less comprehensive and 
less mandatory than the protections set forth in the Third and Fourth Geneva 
 
 94 See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 451–53 (2005) [hereinafter CIHL]. 
 95 See, e.g., GC IV, supra note 9, arts. 107–12; GC III, supra note 9, arts. 71–77. 
 96 GC IV, supra note 9, art. 5. (“Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is detained as 
a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the Occupying 
Power, such person shall, in those cases where absolute military security so requires, be regarded as having 
forfeited rights of communication under the present Convention.”). 
 97 GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 58. 
 98 See AP II, supra note 9, art. 1(1). 
 99 Id. art. 5(2)(b). 
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Conventions, but it does represent an important recognition that persons 
detained during non-international armed conflict must not be held 
incommunicado. 
The ICCPR does not delineate specific rights to communication for persons 
detained in non-conflict situations. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations mandates that all foreign nationals detained before or after 
trial have a right to consular visits and communication.100 Furthermore, in two 
comprehensive sets of principles regarding the rights of detained persons and 
the obligations regarding their treatment, the UN has set forth several rules or 
minimum standards with regard to communication. The UN Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners states that prisoners “shall be 
allowed under necessary supervision to communicate with their family and 
reputable friends at regular intervals, both by correspondence and by receiving 
visits.”101 This document also reinforces the right to consular visits and 
communication, as does the UN General Assembly’s Body of Principles for 
the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment.102 
******* 
Divergent characterizations of a conflict or blurred lines between situations 
can lead to significant ambiguities and operational complexities regarding who 
has authority to detain individuals and for how long. For example, varying 
characterizations of the situation in Afghanistan have led not only to divergent 
practices between U.S. forces engaged in the Operation Enduring Freedom and 
ISAF missions, but to multiple different practices among the ISAF contributing 
states.103 For example, while one state authorizes its forces to detain under the 
ISAF aegis, another refuses to detain at all. Thus, when the latter state finds 
itself in a position where it must detain an individual, it will not detain that 
individual, but rather hold him or her in place until a detaining state can arrive 
to detain the individual. Moreover, divergent practices among even the ISAF 
 
 100 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 27 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
 101 First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Geneva, 
Switz., Aug. 22–Sept. 3, 1955, Proceedings of the Congress, Annex I(A) art. 37, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/6/1, at 
69 [hereinafter Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners]. 
 102 G.A. Res. 43/173, annex princ. 16(2), U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/173 (Dec. 9, 1988). 
 103 See generally AFG. INDEP. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, TORTURE, TRANSFERS, AND DENIAL OF DUE 
PROCESS: THE TREATMENT OF CONFLICT-RELATED DETAINEES IN AFGHANISTAN (2012), available at 
http://www.aihrc.org.af/media/files/AIHRC%20OSF%20Detentions%20Report%20English%2017-3-2012% 
20%28Final%29%20.pdf. 
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detaining states led NATO, after several years, to finally impose the uniform 
ninety-six hour detention rule on all ISAF forces.104 In addition, as the past 
decade has highlighted, uncertainty or debate regarding the overarching legal 
paradigm for a conflict between a state and non-state terrorist groups—
including questions regarding the characterization, duration, and geographic 
parameters of the conflict, among others—have left states and others “without 
clear, comprehensive international rules to govern . . . detention operations.”105 
2. Treatment 
In all situations—whether international or non-international armed conflict, 
or a non-conflict situation—international law protects all individuals, including 
those who have been detained, from cruel or inhuman treatment and torture. 
Beyond the provisions in the four Geneva Conventions that apply in all 
situations of international armed conflict, international law contains numerous 
prohibitions on the use of torture and other abusive treatment.106 In internal 
armed conflict, “[t]he treatment of detainees is governed by the domestic law 
of the country concerned, any human rights treaties binding on that state in the 
time of armed conflict and . . . basic humanitarian principles.”107 The 
prohibition against torture is jus cogens and no derogations are allowed, 
whether in times of national crisis or armed conflict.108 
POWs and protected persons in an international armed conflict or 
occupation, however, are specially protected from not just cruel or inhuman 
treatment, but also from insult or public display.109 Similarly, human rights law 
prohibits subjecting civilian prisoners to insult or public curiosity.110 The 
comprehensive international law prohibitions on torture and cruel or inhuman 
 
 104 See Press Conference, James Appathurai, NATO Spokesman, Remarks on the Foreign Ministers’ 
Meetings (Dec. 8, 2005), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s051208g.htm (outlining IASF 
detention policy). 
 105 John B. Bellinger & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in Contemporary Conflicts: Four 
Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 201, 202 (2011); see also 
Deeks, supra note 37, at 434 (arguing for the acceptance of five basic rules governing detention in all 
situations to avoid the challenges of conflict characterization, promote counterinsurgency goals, and, in 
multinational detention operations, “ensur[e] that allies start from the same procedural propositions”). 
 106 See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter UN Convention Against 
Torture]. 
 107 U.K. MANUAL, supra note 39, ¶ 15.30.3. 
 108 UN Convention Against Torture, supra note 106, annex art. 2. 
 109 GC III, supra note 9, art. 13. 
 110 See, e.g., Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra note 101, art. 45(1). 
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treatment, found in LOAC and in human rights law, lead to similar legal 
paradigms for treatment of detainees across the spectrum of conflict 
characterization. However, differing characterizations of conflict do impact 
one area of treatment in particular: the privileges owed to POWs in 
international armed conflict and civilians detained by an occupying authority. 
For example, Article 25 of the Third Geneva Convention mandates that POWs 
be “quartered under conditions as favourable as those for the forces of the 
Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area,”111 with allowances made 
for special national or religious practices, and separate sleeping quarters for 
women and men.112 POWs and civilian internees “shall enjoy complete latitude 
in the exercise of their religious duties”113 and have access to “intellectual, 
educational and recreational pursuits, sports and games.”114 Such privileges do 
not apply to adult individuals detained in a non-international armed conflict or 
in a non-conflict situation. Treatment is thus one area in which fundamental 
norms of international law prohibiting torture and inhuman treatment across all 
situations create a consistent paradigm for the treatment of persons detained in 
a range of situations. Nonetheless, the types of seeming technicalities 
described above are relevant and can present stumbling blocks in the absence 
of clear legal frameworks on the ground. 
3. Trial 
The trial of detainees—and the nature and amount of process afforded to 
them—depends on the character of the conflict and status of the detainee. In 
international armed conflicts, including occupation, international law strictly 
regulates the trial of POWs.115 POWs can be tried only in a court-martial and 
only for offenses for which soldiers of the detaining state would likewise be 
tried.116 Most importantly, under the principle of combatant immunity 
explained above, LOAC proscribes the trial of a lawful combatant for lawful 
acts of war committed within the context of an armed conflict—thus, for 
instance, a combatant may not be prosecuted for murder for the otherwise 
lawful act of killing an enemy combatant.117 Combatants are, however, subject 
to trial for war crimes, other pre-capture criminal acts unrelated to the conflict, 
 
 111 GC III, supra note 9, art. 25. 
 112 U.K. MANUAL, supra note 39, ¶ 8.49. 
 113 GC IV, supra note 9, art. 93. 
 114 Id. art. 94. 
 115 See, e.g., GC III, supra note 9, arts. 84–88. 
 116 Id. arts. 84, 87. 
 117 See id. art. 99; supra text accompanying note 34. 
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and crimes committed during captivity.118 Individuals who engage in hostilities 
but are not combatants can be tried in a variety of fora, including military 
commissions, domestic courts, international tribunals, and other appropriate 
venues. In all such cases, however, international law mandates a minimum 
threshold of judicial guarantees and protections.119 During occupation, 
detained civilians are subject to the laws and courts of the occupied state that 
existed prior to the occupation.120 
In internal armed conflict, on the other hand, LOAC offers little guidance 
for trials of either persons who are fighting or other individuals. All persons 
taking no active part in hostilities are protected from extrajudicial sentencing 
and execution, as informed by general principles of international law.121 
Customary international humanitarian law applicable in non-international 
armed conflict is recognized as guaranteeing a right to fair trial for all 
detainees.122 Importantly, though, individuals engaged in a non-international 
armed conflict are not protected by combatant immunity, meaning they may be 
tried under domestic law for murder for engaging in acts which, had they been 
committed by a combatant during an international armed conflict, would be 
considered lawful.123 Ultimately, persons detained during a non-international 
armed conflict, though protected by Common Article 3, are subject to domestic 
law.124 
Obviously, persons detained in a non-conflict scenario are subject to the 
established law of the host state in the tribunals of that state. Multinational or 
 
 118 Corn & Finegan, supra note 4, at 1121–23; Joseph P. Bialke, Al-Qaeda & Taliban Unlawful 
Combatant Detainees, Unlawful Belligerency, and the International Laws of Armed Conflict, 55 A.F. L. REV. 
1, 9–10 (2004). 
 119 See AP I, supra note 9, art. 75. 
 120 Detained civilians are also subject to any newly enacted provisions of the occupying power subject to 
the provisions of Fourth Geneva Convention, including its prohibition on retroactivity. See GC IV, supra note 
9, art. 65. 
 121 Common Article 3, supra note 12. 
 122 CIHL, supra note 94, at 352–54. A fair trial is one: that is conducted before an independent, impartial, 
and regularly constituted court; that presumes the innocence of the detainee; where the detainee has been 
informed of the nature and cause of the charges against him; where the detainee is provided with the means 
and opportunity to defend himself; and where the trial is public and occurs without undue delay. 
 123 John P. Cerone, Status of Detainees in Non-international Armed Conflict, and Their Protection in the 
Course of Criminal Proceedings: The Case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS (Am. Soc’y 
of Int’l Law, Wash. D.C.), July 14, 2006, available at http://www.asil.org/insights060714.cfm (noting that 
“non-state combatants in a non-international armed conflict may be prosecuted for all hostile acts, including 
violations of ordinary domestic law, irrespective of whether they have violated any norms of international 
law”). 
 124 Id. 
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foreign forces deployed to a host state as part of a stability operations mission 
may be subject to either the host state’s domestic law or the deploying state’s 
domestic law, depending on a governing Status of Forces Agreement 
(“SOFA”) or, potentially, an applicable UN mandate. 
Complex military operations and uncertain characterization can create a 
range of ambiguities and complications in this area. Without a firm legal 
framework in place, military and civilian actors on the ground may face 
significant uncertainties regarding who can be tried, in what venue, under what 
procedures, and for what crimes. As a consequence, individuals detained may 
face lengthier detention and a lack of access to individual accountability 
determinations because of the need to assess the appropriate parameters for 
trials. 
4. Transfer 
The principle of non-refoulement and the associated human rights 
protections apply to the transfer of prisoners at all times. According to these 
protections, individuals may not be transferred to states where they will likely 
suffer severe human rights deprivations, particularly torture or inhuman 
treatment.125 Most importantly, “[t]he prohibition on torture is regarded as 
nonderogable, not subject to any exclusions, and also binding where the 
rendering state is a party to the treaty but the receiving state is not.”126 Non-
refoulement is a foundational principle in refugee law, which has an important 
role for the protection of persons caught up in armed conflict. Article 33 of the 
1951 Refugee Convention prohibits the forcible return or expulsion of a 
refugee “in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life 
or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”127 
Within the context of armed conflict, recent experiences in Afghanistan and 
Iraq demonstrate the relevance of transfer and the applicable legal frameworks 
in today’s conflicts and military operations. In particular, the main transfer-
related issues that may differ based on the characterization of a given situation 
include where and to whom a detainee may be transferred, and post-transfer 
monitoring obligations. 
 
 125 See UN Convention Against Torture, supra note 106, art. 3. 
 126 Joan Fitzpatrick, Rendition and Transfer in the War Against Terrorism: Guantanamo and Beyond, 25 
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 457, 477 (2003). 
 127 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, July 28, 2951, 19 U.S.T. 6259. 
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a. Transfer Where and to Whom? 
LOAC places some limitations on the ability of a detaining authority to 
transfer detainees in an armed conflict. In international armed conflict, POWs 
can only be transferred to another state that is a party to the Geneva 
Conventions.128 Furthermore, POWs are not to be transferred to an internment 
facility that imposes additional hardship on their eventual repatriation.129 For 
civilian internees held during occupation, the Fourth Geneva Convention 
prohibits occupying authorities from transferring civilian detainees out of the 
occupied state.130 Protected persons, as defined in Article 4 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, also cannot be transferred to a state that is not a party to 
the Geneva Conventions.131 Although all states are parties to the Geneva 
Conventions, making this obligation—and the corresponding obligation 
regarding transfer of POWs—seem no longer important, it does highlight the 
importance placed on ensuring that POWs and protected persons retain the 
protections of the Geneva Conventions in all situations. One notable difference 
between the transfer regimes for POWs and for protected persons is that the 
Fourth Geneva Convention specifically prohibits the transfer of a protected 
person “to a country where he or she may have reason to fear persecution for 
his or her political opinions or religious beliefs,”132 a direct incorporation of 
the full scope of non-refoulement. In all transfer cases, the detainee or POW is 
to be afforded opportunity to notify his next of kin if he is transferred.133 
Although the law of non-international armed conflict offers little black 
letter guidance regarding the transfer of detainees in a non-international armed 
conflict, the overarching international legal framework of non-refoulement in 
human rights law and refugee law continues to apply at all times. Therefore, 
detainees in non-international armed conflict cannot be transferred to a state or 
another party where they will face torture or inhuman treatment.134 Article 5(4) 
of Additional Protocol II does recognize the need for detaining powers to 
consider the subsequent treatment of released or transferred detainees by 
noting that, when releasing detainees, “necessary measures to ensure their 
safety shall be taken by those so deciding.”135 At a minimum, this provision 
 
 128 GC III, supra note 9, art. 12. 
 129 Id. art. 46. 
 130 GC IV, supra note 9, art. 49. 
 131 Id. art. 45. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. art. 106; GC III, supra note 9, art. 48. 
 134 See UN Convention Against Torture, supra note 106, art 3. 
 135 AP II, supra note 9, art. 5(4). 
BLANK GALLEYSPROOFS.1 6/8/2012 2:19 PM 
2012] COMPLEX LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 115 
reinforces the principles and obligations inherent in non-refoulement. In 
addition, the protections in Article 12 of the Third Geneva Convention and 
Article 45 of the Fourth Geneva Convention can be seen as a useful guide even 
in non-international armed conflict. Thus, 
the humanitarian principle underlying these provisions, namely that a 
detaining power should ensure that the ally to whom it transfers 
detainees treats them according to the standards of the Geneva 
Conventions, should also be taken into account in non-international 
armed conflict (especially in so-called internationalized non-
international armed conflicts—that is, internal conflicts in which 
foreign troops from outside the country intervene on the side of the 
government). For instance, if countries contributing troops to a 
multinational force in a non-international armed conflict transfer 
detainees amongst each other, the principle underlying Articles 12(2) 
of the Third and 45(3) of the Fourth Geneva Convention should be 
taken into account.136 
Similarly, domestic law and human rights law govern the transfer of any 
detainees during a non-conflict situation as well, even when military personnel 
are involved. 
b. Post-transfer Monitoring and Obligations 
A detaining party in international armed conflict or occupation may not 
transfer a detainee to another authority that will violate the provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions.137 For both POWs and protected persons, the authority 
responsible for the original detention of an individual retains responsibility for 
the detainee’s treatment even after transferring the detainee to another 
authority.138 Article 12 of the Third Geneva Convention thus mandates that 
such transfers can only take place “after the Detaining Power has satisfied 
itself of the willingness and ability of such transferee Power to apply the 
Convention.”139 Although the transferee state then assumes responsibility for 
the application of all obligations in the Geneva Conventions regarding the 
detainees, the transferring state has obligations to step in and rectify the 
 
 136 Cordula Droege, Transfer of Detainees: Legal Framework, Non-refoulement, and Contemporary 
Challenges, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 669, 675–76 (2008) (noting that the norms of humanitarian law, refugee 
law, and human rights law must be seen as complimentary in such situations, not exclusionary). 
 137 See GC III, supra note 9, art. 12; GC IV, supra note 9, art. 45. 
 138 GC III, supra note 9, art. 12; GC IV, supra note 9, art. 45. 
 139 GC III, supra note 9, art. 12. The Fourth Geneva Convention contains the same requirement with 
regard to transfers of Protected Persons in Article 45. See GC IV, supra note 9, art. 45. 
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situation.140 As the Commentary to the Third Geneva Convention explains, this 
system of subsidiary responsibility helps ensure appropriate treatment for any 
transferred persons.141 Thus, the transferring power, upon learning of 
inadequacies in treatment, may send direct assistance in the form of food, 
medical equipment and personnel, or other provisions.142 
If these measures nevertheless prove inadequate, if the poor treatment 
given to prisoners is not caused merely by temporary difficulties but 
by ill-will on the part of the receiving Power, or if for any other 
reason the situation cannot be remedied, the Power which originally 
transferred the prisoners must request that they be returned to it.143 
These responsibilities will often have a powerful impact on detention 
decisions early on, such as in the Vietnam War, for example. Amidst the 
complexity of the characterization of the conflict and the varied categories of 
individuals involved in the conflict and being detained by U.S. forces, the 
United States also faced the practical considerations involved in seeking to 
transfer detainees to the South Vietnamese authorities. By characterizing a 
broad swath of detainees as POWs, the United States ensured that it remained 
in compliance with these obligations under the Third Geneva Convention.144 
Transfer obligations and implementation is an area in which uncertainty 
regarding the characterization of a conflict or situation—or differing 
characterizations—and the resultant ambiguities are particularly problematic, 
especially in multinational operations. For example, in Afghanistan, a variety 
 
 140 See, e.g., GC III, supra note 9, art. 12 (“Nevertheless, if [the transferee] Power fails to carry out the 
provisions of the Convention in any important respect, the Power by whom the prisoners of war were 
transferred shall . . . take effective measures to correct the situation or shall request the return of the prisoners 
of war.”). Article 45 of the Fourth Geneva Convention contains the same obligation. GC IV, supra note 9, art. 
45.  
 141 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION (III) RELATIVE TO THE 
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 137 (1952). 
 142 Id. at 138–39. 
 143 Id. at 139. 
 144 GEORGE S. PRUGH, VIETNAM STUDIES: LAW AT WAR: VIETNAM 1964–1973, at 66 (1975) (“The 
classification of Viet Cong combatants and Viet Cong suspects posed an interesting legal problem. Because it 
believed the Viet Cong were traitors and criminals, the Vietnam government was reluctant to accord prisoner 
of war status to Viet Cong captives. Furthermore it was certainly arguable that many Viet Cong did not meet 
the criteria of guerrillas entitled to prisoner of war status under Article 4, Geneva Prisoner of War 
Conventions. However, civil incarceration and criminal trial of the great number of Viet Cong was too much 
for the civil resources at hand. In addition, Article 22 prohibited the mingling of civil defendants with 
prisoners of war. By broadly construing Article 4, so as to accord full prisoner of war status to Viet Cong Main 
Force and Local Force troops, as well as regular North Vietnamese Army troops, any Viet Cong taken in 
combat would be detained for a prisoner of war camp rather than a civilian jail.”). 
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of considerations played a role in transfer decisions: the desire to assist the host 
government in building capacity to ensure law and order, ISAF’s ninety-six-
hour rule for release or transfer of detainees, and the fact that most 
international organizations or states operating in Afghanistan do not have 
facilities for holding people in custody.145 Because none of these 
considerations would justify the failure to fulfill international legal obligations 
under the principle of non-refoulement,146 many states have simply not 
engaged in detention operations at all. In situations where multiple forces are 
engaged in detention and possibly trial, such ambiguities can create situations 
in which transfers are not carried out appropriately or are delayed 
unnecessarily simply through a lack of clear legal guidelines. In addition, a 
common problem is that in each new scenario, operators on the ground must 
reinvent effective procedures in the absence of a discernable legal framework. 
Questions of authority, obligation, individual rights, and procedures thus loom 
large along the fault lines between different types of conflict and non-conflict 
scenarios. 
B. Use of Force and Conduct of Hostilities 
States use military force in a wide range of situations, including many 
outside of defined armed conflict scenarios. Considerations pertaining to the 
use of force pose some of the most complicated issues in complex military 
operations. The fundamental split between LOAC (applicable in times of 
armed conflict) and human rights law (the governing framework in non-
conflict situations and applicable during conflict subject to the more specific 
authority of LOAC) highlights these challenges at the most basic level. LOAC 
authorizes states to use force as a first resort against legitimate targets. In 
contrast, human rights law requires that force be used only as a last resort, a 
traditional law enforcement paradigm. The use of force outside an armed 
conflict scenario also implicates the international law of self-defense. 
 
 145 Droege, supra note 136, at 693. 
 146 Id. (“Transfers arising in multinational operations abroad are only now drawing attention to legal and 
practical issues. The real challenge will be to find practical solutions to accommodate the object and purpose 
of those operations and their inherent restrictions as operations carried out at the invitation of the host 
government and often under the auspices or even under the command and control of the United Nations. 
Solutions will have to take into account the very limited capacity and political will to detain persons who 
should normally be detained by the host country, while at the same time respecting the principle of non-
refoulement. Solutions can encompass, among others, prolongation of temporary detention, transfers to third 
states, transfers to specific places where there is no risk, and monitoring or even joint administration of 
detention to monitor transferred persons.”). 
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Within these parameters, targeting issues, types of weapons, and the role 
and authority of host nations in stability operations are key areas where lack of 
characterization or conflicting characterizations can create ambiguities and 
uncertainties for operators on the ground. Of particular concern are the 
protection of civilians and individual rights, the implementation of 
counterinsurgency principles within the framework of differing operations and 
situations, and questions regarding the legitimacy of military operations. Each 
of these concerns is highly relevant to the considerations raised above 
regarding the forfeiting of options and the risk of legal violations. Issues 
regarding use of force produce significant policy challenges beyond the legal 
issues set forth below. These policy questions—such as public support for 
military operations, effective coordination with allies and with host nation 
officials and entities, and the coordination of multiple missions—can play a 
major role in the effectiveness of military operations, both at home and on the 
ground. 
1. Targeting 
In an armed conflict, LOAC permits the use of lethal force as a first resort 
against legitimate military objectives, whether persons or objects.147 LOAC’s 
fundamental principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack 
guide the use of force and targeting considerations in all situations.148 One of 
the most fundamental issues during conflict is identifying who or what can be 
targeted. The principle of distinction, one of the “cardinal principles” of 
LOAC, requires that any party to a conflict distinguish between those who are 
fighting and those who are not and direct attacks solely at the former.149 
Similarly, parties must distinguish between civilian objects and military 
objects and target only the latter.150 The obligation to distinguish forms part of 
 
 147 Geoffrey S. Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying Human Rights 
Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 J. INT’L HUM. LEGAL STUDIES 52, 74–75 (2010). 
 148 Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting and International Humanitarian Law in Afghanistan, 85 NAVAL WAR 
C. INT’L L. 307, 308, 312, 323 (2009) (“Although the conflict [in Afghanistan] has become non-international, 
it must be understood that the IHL norms governing attacks in international armed conflicts, on one hand, and 
non-international armed attacks, on the other, have become nearly indistinguishable.”). 
 149 Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, 257 (July 8) (separate opinion of Judge Higgins) (declaring that distinction and the prohibition on 
unnecessary suffering are the two cardinal principles of international humanitarian law). 
 150 AP I, supra note 9, art. 48 (“[T]o ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and 
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations 
only against military objectives.”). Article 48 is considered customary international law. See CIHL, supra note 
94, at 1 (2005). 
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the customary international law of both international and non-international 
armed conflicts, as the ICTY held in the Tadic case.151 The purpose of 
distinction—to protect civilians—is emphasized in Article 51 of Additional 
Protocol I, which states that “[t]he civilian population as such, as well as 
individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.”152 
Distinction thus requires identification of lawful targets as a prerequisite to 
the use of force in armed conflict. A lawful attack must be directed at a 
legitimate target: either a combatant, member of an organized armed group, a 
civilian directly participating in hostilities, or a military objective.153 In 
international armed conflicts, all members of the state’s regular armed forces 
are combatants and can be identified by the uniform they wear, among other 
characteristics.154 Other persons falling within the category of combatant 
include members of volunteer militia who meet four requirements: wearing a 
distinctive emblem, carrying arms openly, operating under responsible 
command, and abiding by LOAC.155 Members of the regular armed forces of a 
government not recognized by the opposing party and civilians participating in 
a levée en masse also qualify as combatants in international armed conflict.156 
Combatants can be attacked at all times and enjoy no immunity from attack, 
except when they are hors de combat due to sickness, wounds, or capture. In 
non-international armed conflicts, including state versus non-state actor 
conflicts, there is no combatant status, but individuals who are members of an 
organized armed group are legitimate targets of attack at all times.157 Finally, 
 
 151 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal, 
¶¶ 27, 111 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (“Bearing in mind the need for measures 
to ensure the better protection of human rights in armed conflicts of all types, [. . . the General Assembly] 
Affirms the following basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts, without 
prejudice to their future elaboration within the framework of progressive development of the international law 
of armed conflict: . . . 2. In the conduct of military operations during armed conflicts, a distinction must be 
made at all times between persons actively taking part in the hostilities and civilian populations.”) (alteration 
in original) (quoting G.A. Res. 2675 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2675 (XXV) (Dec. 9, 1970)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted); see also Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at 257 (distinction is one of the “intransgressible principles of international 
customary law”); Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 doc. 6 rev. ¶ 178 (1997), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/97eng/ 
Argentina11137.htm#_ftn1; CIHL, supra note 94, at 7–8. 
 152 AP I, supra note 9, art. 51(2). 
 153 See id. art. 48. 
 154 GC III, supra note 9, art. 4(1). 
 155 Id. art. 4(A)(2). 
 156 Id. arts. 4(A)(3), 4(A)(6). 
 157 See Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 991, 995, 999 (2008); see also JIMMY GURULÉ & 
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civilians who take direct participation in hostilities are also legitimate targets 
of attack during and for such time as they engage directly in hostilities.158 
The principle of proportionality requires that parties refrain from attacks in 
which the expected civilian casualties will be excessive in relation to the 
anticipated military advantage gained.159 Proportionality is not a mathematical 
concept, but rather a guideline to help ensure that military commanders weigh 
the consequences of a particular attack and refrain from launching attacks that 
will cause excessive civilian deaths. The principle of proportionality is well-
accepted as an element of customary international law applicable in all armed 
conflicts.160 
The third key targeting principle concerns precautions. LOAC mandates 
that all parties take certain precautionary measures to protect civilians.161 
Precautions are, understandably, a critical component of the law’s efforts to 
protect civilians and are of particular importance in densely populated areas or 
areas where civilians are at risk from the consequences of military operations. 
For this reason, even if a target is legitimate under the laws of war, failure to 
take precautions can make an attack on that target unlawful. First, parties must 
do everything feasible to ensure that targets are military objectives.162 Second, 
they must choose the means and methods of attack with the aim of minimizing 
incidental civilian losses and damage.163 Third, when choosing between two 
possible attacks offering similar military advantage, parties must choose the 
objective that offers the least likely harm to civilians and civilian objects.164 
Fourth, parties are required to refrain from any attacks that would be 
disproportionate and to cancel any attacks where it becomes evident that the 
civilian losses would be excessive in light of the military advantage.165 Finally, 
 
GEOFFREY S. CORN, PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-TERRORISM LAW 70–76 (2011) (discussing the rules governing 
targeting of enemy forces in international and non-international armed conflict and noting that (1) “a member 
of an enemy force . . . is presumed hostile and therefore presumptively subject to attack” in international armed 
conflict; and (2) “subjecting members of organized belligerent groups to status based targeting pursuant to the 
LOAC as opposed to civilians who periodically lose their protection from attack seems both logical and 
consistent with the practice of states engaged in non-international armed conflicts”). 
 158 AP I, supra note 9, art. 51(3). 
 159 Id. art. 51(5)(b). 
 160 Michael N. Schmitt, Fault Lines in the Law of Attack, in TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 277, 292 (Susan C Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-Neale eds., 2006); 
Yoram Dinstein, The Laws of Air, Missile and Nuclear Warfare, 27 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 1, 7 (1997). 
 161 AP I, supra note 9, art. 57. 
 162 Id. art. 57(2)(a)(i). 
 163 Id. art. 57(2)(a)(ii). 
 164 Id. art. 57(3). 
 165 Id. arts. 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b). 
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Article 57(2)(c) of Additional Protocol I requires attacking parties to issue an 
effective advance warning “of attacks which may affect the civilian population, 
unless circumstances do not permit.”166 Each of these steps requires an 
attacking party to take affirmative action to preserve civilian immunity and 
minimize civilian casualties and damage. 
These obligations to take precautions apply in both international and non-
international armed conflict and are considered customary international law.167 
Article 13(1) of Additional Protocol II protects civilians and the civilian 
population from the dangers arising from military operations;168 the principle 
of precautions forms a natural component of that obligation. The obligation to 
take precautions also appears in other treaties applicable in non-international 
armed conflict, such as Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons169 and Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for 
the Protection of Cultural Property.170 
In the absence of an armed conflict, international human rights law and the 
principles governing the use of force in law enforcement will govern. Article 6 
of the ICCPR states that “[e]very human being has the inherent right to life. 
This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
life.”171 In a slightly different formulation, the European Convention on the 
Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms establishes the right to life 
 
 166 Id. art. 57(2)(c). 
 167 CIHL, supra note 94, at 51; see also AP I, supra note 9, arts. 57–58; Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case 
No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 524 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000). 
 168 AP II, supra note 9, art. 13(1). 
 169 Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other 
Devices (Amended Protocol II) arts. 3(4), 4, May 3, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-1 (1997) (“All feasible 
precautions shall be taken to protect civilians from the effects of weapons to which this Article applies. 
Feasible precautions are those precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all 
circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.”). 
 170 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event 
of Armed Conflict art. 7, Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 172 (“Without prejudice to other precautions required 
by international humanitarian law in the conduct of military operations, each Party to the conflict shall: (a) do 
everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are not cultural property protected under Article 
4 of the Convention; (b) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view 
to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental damage to cultural property protected under Article 4 
of the Convention; (c) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental 
damage to cultural property protected under Article 4 of the Convention which would be excessive in relation 
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; and (d) cancel or suspend an attack if it becomes 
apparent: (i) that the objective is cultural property protected under Article 4 of the Convention: (ii) that the 
attack may be expected to cause incidental damage to cultural property protected under Article 4 of the 
Convention which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”). 
 171 ICCPR, supra note 29, art. 6. 
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and states that any “[d]eprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in 
contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no 
more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful 
violence.”172 Here, the use of lethal force is—appropriately—tightly prescribed 
and extraordinarily restricted.173 In such situations, it is the target’s conduct—
some sort of hostile action or threat—that justifies the use of force, in contrast 
to armed conflicts, where many individuals (combatants and members of 
organized armed groups) are targetable based solely on their membership in a 
hostile organization or enemy armed force. In the case of civilians directly 
participating in hostilities, of course, targeting is on the basis of conduct. 
Ambiguities regarding whether a particular situation is a conflict or not can 
undoubtedly create uncertainties and confusion with regard to targeting, the 
use of force, and accompanying obligations.174 
We can see some of these basic challenges in Afghanistan, where until 
recently some ISAF contributing states did not characterize the situation as a 
conflict.175 As a result, their forces could only employ force as a means of self-
defense,176 which impacts not only the use of force in specific situations, but 
also the types of operations different coalition partners would and could 
 
 172 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 173 See Eighth United Nations Conference on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 
Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27–Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law 
Enforcement Officials, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (stating that force can only be used “in self-
defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration 
of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a danger and 
resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to 
achieve these objectives”); David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-judicial 
Executions or Legitimate Means of Defense?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 176 (2005) (“Under [international 
human rights law,] the intentional use of lethal force by state authorities can be justified only in strictly limited 
conditions. The state is obliged to respect and ensure the rights of every person to life and to due process of 
law. Any intentional use of lethal force by state authorities that is not justified under the provisions regarding 
the right to life, will, by definition, be regarded as an ‘extra-judicial execution.’”). 
 174 For a comprehensive treatment of the consequences of blurring the lines between the parameters of the 
use of force in armed conflict and in self-defense (i.e., outside of armed conflict), see Laurie R. Blank, 
Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of Blurring the Lines Between the Armed Conflict and Self-defense 
Justifications, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2012). 
 175 See, e.g., Changing the Rules in Afghanistan: German Troops Beef Up Fight Against Taliban, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE INT’L (July 9, 2009), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,635192,00.html [hereinafter 
Changing the Rules in Afghanistan] (describing the shift in the German government’s characterization of the 
conflict). 
 176 See id. (noting that, in 2006, the German government added to the NATO operations plan a prohibition 
on the use of lethal force except when an attack is underway or imminent; the provision was subsequently 
removed in 2009). 
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undertake at all. Where, as is the case in Afghanistan, some members of allied 
forces operate under the rubric of non-international armed conflict and others 
operate under a non-conflict characterization,177 allied forces often might 
engage in joint operations under different rules of engagement and parameters 
for the use of force. Divergent characterizations, leading to uncertain or even 
contrasting legal paradigms governing the use of force, can leave those forces 
vulnerable to miscommunication, inaction, and even danger. 
Beyond the foundational issues apparent in the differing paradigms for the 
use of force—above all whether it can be used in first resort or only in last 
resort—there are additional areas where ambiguities can arise and cause 
operational challenges. One involves compensation for the destruction of life 
or property. Under U.S. law, for example, losses from combat are non-
compensable, even though there may be specified authority to pay solatia,178 
while losses from non-combat activities or wrongful or negligent acts are 
compensable.179 Although this may at first appear to be a technical procedural 
issue, it can become a complicated operational challenge in the face of 
ambiguities regarding the controlling legal framework. Other areas that raise 
potential concerns involve the use of force to defend others and the use of 
force to defend property. Each of these is primarily addressed in the rules of 
engagement (“ROE”), but can become quite complicated in complex 
multinational operations in which disputes arise over the formulation and 
implementation of ROE among different forces and in accordance with 
different legal frameworks and mission objectives. 
2. Weapons 
Along with questions of lawful use of force, the range of permissible 
weapons depends on the characterization of the situation. Any potential 
ambiguities regarding permitted weapons generally occur along the line 
between armed conflict and non-conflict, and, unlike the other key areas here, 
 
 177 Until late 2009, for example, Germany did not view its participation in ISAF as part of an armed 
conflict. See id.; Thomas Darnstadt, Opinion, Germany Should Face Up to Reality of Civil War in Afghanistan, 
SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (July 27, 2009), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,639203,00.html. 
 178 The Department of Defense uses its discretion to pay solatia to injured civilians or their families in 
Afghanistan or Iraq. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-699, MILITARY 
OPERATIONS: THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S USE OF SOLATIA AND CONDOLENCE PAYMENTS IN IRAQ AND 
AFGHANISTAN (2007). Solatium is compensation for grief, as opposed to traditional damages for injury. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1519 (9th ed. 2009). 
 179 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2006). 
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do not generally arise in the distinction between international and internal 
armed conflict. 
International law prohibits two categories of weapons in armed conflict: 
indiscriminate weapons and weapons that cause unnecessary suffering. The 
first prohibition appears in Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I, which 
defines indiscriminate attacks as attacks not directed at a specific military 
objective; attacks “which employ a method or means of combat which cannot 
be directed at a military objective; or [attacks] which employ a method or 
means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this 
Protocol.”180 Second, weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous 
injury are prohibited.181 The goal is to minimize harm that is not justified by 
military utility, either because of a lack of any utility at all or because the 
utility gained is considerably outweighed by the suffering caused. These two 
regulations on the use of weapons are part of customary international law in all 
armed conflicts.182 
However, some weapons prohibited under LOAC are lawful for use in law 
enforcement scenarios, such as expanding bullets. LOAC prohibits exploding 
or expanding projectiles (e.g., hollow point rounds) because they cause 
unnecessary suffering.183 An enemy soldier is rendered hors de combat just as 
effectively with normal non-expanding bullets. However, expanding bullets have 
an important and legitimate use in civilian law enforcement situations. Bullets 
that expand on impact are less likely to go through the target and hit innocent 
bystanders or do collateral damage to property (for example, the skin of an 
aircraft).184 For this reason, they are especially valuable in hostage and counter-
terrorist operations. In today’s complex conflicts involving both military 
operations against terrorists and a range of other counterterrorism measures, it is 
not difficult to see how ambiguities in the characterization of situations can lead 
to uncertainty regarding the application of this prohibition. 
 
 180 AP I, supra note 9, art. 51(4). 
 181 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(e), Oct. 18, 1907, 
36 Stat. 2277, reprinted in CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS OF 1899 (II) 
AND 1907 (IV) RESPECTING THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON LAND (1915). 
 182 Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, 257 (July 8) (separate opinion of Judge Higgins). 
 183 Hague Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets, July 29, 1899, 36 Stat. 2277; U.K. 
MANUAL, supra note 39, ¶ 6.1. In addition, the use of such bullets is a war crime under the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(xix), opened for 
signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2002). 
 184 Use of Expanding Ammunition by U.S. Military Forces in Counterterrorist Incidents, Op. JAG, U.S. 
Army, DAJA-IA/No. 7026, 23 Sept. 1985, as reprinted in ARMY LAW., Nov. 1985, at 45, 46. 
BLANK GALLEYSPROOFS.1 6/8/2012 2:19 PM 
2012] COMPLEX LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 125 
Other weapons, such as riot control agents, present similar challenges. 
Under the Chemical Weapons Convention (“CWC”), the use of riot control 
agents is prohibited as a means of warfare.185 At the same time, the CWC 
recognizes that “purposes not prohibited” by the convention include “[l]aw 
enforcement including domestic riot control purposes.”186 Especially in 
situations of occupation, where the occupying power may face difficulties in 
establishing order even while armed conflict continues, finding the dividing 
line between a “method of warfare” and a legitimate law enforcement tool can 
be a daunting task. “[T]he use of riot control agents as a less-than-lethal means 
of law enforcement in the midst of an ongoing armed conflict must [therefore] 
be reconciled with the prohibition on their use as ‘a method of warfare.’”187 
Military operations across a range of situations, including both non-conflict 
and certain stability operations and counterinsurgency, can encounter various 
scenarios in which riot control agents in particular may prove effective, both 
operationally and in light of the overall mission goals. Along the often difficult 
to discern line between conflict and non-conflict, operators on the ground need 
to know what their lawful options are in any given scenario and need to retain 
the flexibility the appropriate legal framework may offer. 
3. Host Nation Control and Influence 
Just as the type of military operations in a foreign country can run the 
gamut from disaster relief to international armed conflict, so the degree of 
influence and authority the host nation government can exert on those 
operations varies widely. Obviously, a nation engaged in an international 
armed conflict with an opposing nation enjoys no authority over that nation’s 
military operations. Beyond that clear-cut situation, however, finding clear 
parameters and common ground regarding the appropriate measure of host 
nation influence on military operations and the determinative legal framework 
for such analysis can be a struggle. 
Moreover, conflicts are not static and the relationship between the host 
state and foreign deployed forces will likely change as a conflict evolves. In 
the case of an occupation, for example, as the occupation matures and as a new 
 
 185 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction art. I(5), Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 (“Each State Party undertakes not 
to use riot control agents as a method of warfare.”). 
 186 Id. art. II(9)(d). 
 187 Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary 
Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 32 (2004). 
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local government is established, or as the occupation transitions into a 
consensual deployment or, potentially, into a non-international armed conflict, 
the host state may enjoy greater influence over operations conducted within the 
host nation. In other situations, a host state will likely exert a greater degree of 
control over forces consensually deployed within its territory—either in a non-
conflict capacity or in support of a non-international armed conflict in which 
the host state is engaged. 
Where the host nation has a measure of influence over the operations being 
conducted in its territory, the degree of control it exerts may be established 
through or limited by a UN mandate, a SOFA, or other instrument setting forth 
the respective authority of the host and visiting forces.188 Frequently, political 
considerations will dictate the influence a host nation exercises. In occupation, 
consent from the occupying force will usually be all that is required. 
Fundamentally, however, the presence of foreign forces within a state’s 
territory is contingent upon that state’s consent. Beyond that, there is little 
framework for understanding exactly where the parameters of host nation 
influence lie regarding the planning and implementation of military operations. 
Recent conflicts offer extensive evidence of the complex nature of these 
relationships. 
For example, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 triggered an 
international armed conflict. Upon the initial defeat of the Taliban and the 
establishment of the Karzai government, it was generally recognized that the 
conflict became a non-international armed conflict between the Karzai 
government and the United States on one side and insurgent Taliban forces on 
the other.189 Many view U.S. operations to combat al Qaeda in Afghanistan as 
a separate non-international armed conflict.190 At the same time, some NATO 
allies participating in ISAF characterize their involvement as non-conflict 
stability operations.191 Additionally, U.S. and other ISAF forces operate under 
a UN mandate while a SOFA governs U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom 
forces.192 Each of these scenarios—whether concurrent or simultaneous—has 
 
 188 See Roisin Burke, Status of Forces Deployed on UN Peacekeeping Operations: Jurisdictional 
Immunity, 16 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 63, 65–66 (2011). 
 189 See Robin Geiss & Michael Siegrist, Has the Armed Conflict in Afghanistan Affected the Rules on the 
Conduct of Hostilities?, 93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 11, 15 (2011) (discussing SOFAs and other mandates with 
regard to UN peacekeeping forces). 
 190 Id. at 51 n.21. 
 191 See supra notes 175–77. 
 192 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1833, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1833 (2008). The SOFA governing the presence of the 
U.S. military in Afghanistan is a diplomatic note. Agreement Regarding the Status of United States Military 
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ramifications for the role and influence of the Afghan government regarding 
operations and for its engagement with different national forces. U.S. 
operations in Pakistan introduce additional questions regarding both the 
government of Pakistan and even the Karzai government given the close links 
between the operations and their key goals and impact on each other. Iraq 
demonstrated these issues as well through a slightly different lens, folding the 
issue of occupation and transition from occupation into the mix. 
C. Civil–Military Relations 
In all situations where military forces are deployed, the relationship 
between the military and a range of civilian actors plays a role, especially as 
international NGOs and multinational military forces work together more often 
in the same theater of operations. Here the potential ambiguities from 
uncertainty regarding the applicable legal framework create operational 
challenges for both military and civilian actors, in essence multiplying the 
potential issues. Three primary areas are of particular interest here: 
humanitarian assistance, the relationship between militaries and 
nongovernmental organizations, and the provision of advisory and training 
services to the host nation government, law enforcement, and military. 
1. Humanitarian Assistance 
It is axiomatic that humanitarian assistance efforts are critical to the 
survival and protection of civilian populations during conflict situations and 
natural disasters, and even in times of internal disturbances. Relief 
organizations often have to navigate access to conflict zones and areas under 
military control, which implicates both domestic and international law, 
depending on the scenario at hand. In armed conflict, international 
humanitarian law recognizes a role for humanitarian assistance organizations 
in alleviating the suffering of civilians, and recognizes the special role of the 
ICRC and its national affiliate organizations in international armed conflicts 
and occupations. 193 
 
and Civilian Personnel of the U.S. Department of Defense Present in Afghanistan in Connection with 
Cooperative Efforts in Response to Terrorism, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, Military Training and 
Exercises, and Other Activities, State Dep’t No. 03-67, available at 2003 WL 21754316, *1–4 (entered into 
force May 28, 2003). 
 193 See GC IV, supra note 9, arts. 3, 10. 
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The law of international armed conflict includes numerous obligations for 
belligerent parties to permit humanitarian relief operations. Article 23 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention requires all states to allow “free passage of all 
consignments of medical and hospital stores and objects for religious worship 
intended only for civilians of another High Contracting Party, even if the latter 
is its adversary.”194 Also included in the free passage obligation are foodstuffs, 
clothing, and other essentials for children, pregnant women, and new 
mothers.195 Article 70 of Additional Protocol I then provides a more 
comprehensive framework for the provision of humanitarian assistance during 
international armed conflict, mandating relief operations for the entire civilian 
population if essential supplies are running low.196 Although this provision 
does state that such relief is provided subject to the agreement of the parties 
concerned, the Commentary to Additional Protocol I explains that parties do 
not have carte blanche to refuse relief shipments; rather, refusals to allow relief 
consignments “should thus remain exceptional.”197 The Fourth Geneva 
Convention also contains specific obligations regarding the provision of 
humanitarian relief during occupation, requiring an occupying power to allow 
and facilitate relief operations when “[all] or part of the population of occupied 
territory is inadequately supplied.”198 All states must permit free passage for 
and protect such consignments of humanitarian relief.199 
During non-international armed conflict, the rules regarding humanitarian 
assistance are significantly sparser. Common Article 3 recognizes the right of 
the ICRC or other independent humanitarian entities to offer assistance to the 
parties to the conflict.200 With regard specifically to the provision of relief 
supplies, Article 18(2) of Additional Protocol II requires humanitarian 
assistance efforts when “the civilian population is suffering undue hardship 
owing to a lack of the supplies essential for its survival, such as foodstuffs and 
medical supplies,”201 subject to the consent of the relevant state where the 
conflict is taking place. The requirement that the government consent to relief 
shipments does raise concerns. However, the Commentary to Additional 
 
 194 Id. art. 23. 
 195 Id. 
 196 AP I, supra note 9, art. 70. 
 197 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS 820 (1977) [hereinafter ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY]. 
 198 GC IV, supra note 9, art. 59. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Common Article 3, supra note 12. 
 201 AP II, supra note 9, art. 18(2). 
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Protocol II reinforces that states cannot withhold access for relief shipments 
without good grounds for doing so. Rather, 
[t]he fact that consent is required does not mean that the decision is 
left to the discretion of the parties. If the survival of the population is 
threatened and a humanitarian organization fulfilling the required 
conditions of impartiality and non-discrimination is able to remedy 
this situation, relief actions must take place.202  
Refusing to allow such shipments in such situations, could be equivalent to 
using starvation as a means of warfare, for example. During the internal 
conflict in Sri Lanka, human rights organizations sharply criticized the Sri 
Lankan government’s restrictions on international aid workers, noting that if 
the government cannot meet its obligations to provide humanitarian relief to 
the civilian population, “it must allow the humanitarian community to do so on 
its behalf. Parties to a conflict must ensure the freedom of movement of 
impartial humanitarian relief personnel—only in cases of military necessity 
may their activities or movements be temporarily restricted.”203 In practice, the 
parameters for the provision of humanitarian relief may prove to be quite 
similar in international and non-international armed conflict, but it is important 
to recognize the differences so that relief organizations can maximize their 
abilities to help those in need during armed conflicts. 
In non-conflict situations, humanitarian relief is subject to the domestic law 
of the host state. Although human rights law mandates that host states may not 
restrict access to relief to the extent that such restrictions would violate the 
state’s human rights obligations, access is ultimately subject to the state’s laws 
governing entry visas, importation guidelines, and similar issues. 
In all of these situations, the relationship between civilian relief workers 
and military personnel will be guided by the relevant legal framework and 
parameters for access to conflict zones or natural disaster areas. Any potential 
ambiguities regarding these legal obligations and privileges may ultimately 
result in diminished services and protection for the civilian population that 
both civilian and military actors on the ground are trying to protect and serve, a 
counterproductive result. 
 
 202 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 197, at 1479. 
 203 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WAR ON THE DISPLACED, SRI LANKAN ARMY AND LTTE ABUSES AGAINST 
CIVILIANS IN THE VANNI 26 (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/srilanka0209 
web_0.pdf. 
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2. Militaries and NGOs 
The relationship between the military and NGOs on the ground during 
military operations can be fraught with interesting challenges, even when both 
actors are working toward the same or similar goals. There are three main 
types of operations in which militaries and NGOs must cooperate: natural 
disasters, such as floods, typhoons, tsunamis, earthquakes, epidemics, or 
famine; technological disasters, such as chemical spills, radiological releases, 
or oil spills; and complex humanitarian emergencies, defined by the United 
Nations as “humanitarian crises in a country, region or society where there is 
total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external 
conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the 
mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme.”204 
The first two situations do not constitute armed conflict and thus do not trigger 
LOAC and its attendant rights and duties. The third category, however, may 
well often rise above the threshold for triggering LOAC, depending on the 
nature and extent of the conflict. 
In most disaster response operations, the military’s primary mission will be 
to establish a safe and secure environment, which enables NGOs to provide 
relief and other assistance as needed. “Carrying out these missions may require 
the military to first establish a secure environment, then to provide 
transportation, communication, and/or security for the NGOs as well as for the 
military force itself.”205 The characterization of the situation—as non-conflict, 
non-international armed conflict, or international armed conflict—will affect 
the rights and obligations military forces have in the course of fulfilling these 
missions, as noted with regard to many of the issues discussed earlier in this 
Article. If the operation takes place in the context of one of the first two types 
of disaster response operations described above, meaning it is not during a 
conflict, the host nation’s domestic law will govern, along with international 
human rights law and any bilateral agreements regarding the provision of 
assistance. During conflict, LOAC will provide the dominant and overarching 
legal framework, but the characterization as non-international or international 
 
 204 INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMM., GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF MILITARY AND CIVIL DEFENCE ASSETS 
TO SUPPORT UNITED NATIONS HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES IN COMPLEX EMERGENCIES 3 (2003), available at 
http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/downloaddoc.aspx?docID=4411&type=pdf. 
 205 LISA WITZIG DAVIDSON ET AL., HUMANITARIAN AND PEACE OPERATIONS: NGOS AND THE MILITARY 
IN THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS 12 (1996), available at http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Davidson_Humanitarian. 
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armed conflict will then affect the extent of the application of host nation law 
and international human rights law. 
One issue that has arisen in Afghanistan and Iraq in recent years is the 
extent of military control of areas where civilian actors, namely international 
NGOs, live and work in the conflict area. In the face of the dangers in both 
conflict zones, it has been common for NGO workers to live in the same 
secured areas as military units.206 Such arrangements often raise questions for 
NGOs regarding their independence, neutrality, and ability to access a range of 
actors—civilian and military—on both sides in the conflict zone. As discussed 
in greater detail above, the military will have greater control over areas in 
certain conflict situations rather than others, such that different conflict 
characterizations can produce differing interpretations of the level of military 
control and NGO access and independence. 
A separate but related issue that stems directly from the close engagement 
between the military and NGOs occurs when military personnel “go 
humanitarian”—e.g., when they use humanitarian cover, in civilian clothing, 
for intelligence gathering and similar activities. Many NGOs raise legitimate 
concerns about the impact on the safety of their personnel in the aftermath of 
such military activities. These concerns are not necessarily directly related to 
questions of conflict characterization or applicable legal frameworks, but 
certainly arise with greater frequency and concern in conflict situations rather 
than non-conflict situations, reinforcing the need to clarify the line between the 
two. 
3. Training and Advisory Roles 
In today’s counterinsurgency and stability operations, the interface between 
the military and the host nation is a critical piece of the mission, not just for the 
purpose of coordinating operations, but to enhance capacity building across the 
range of the judicial, security and political infrastructure. Military advisors 
often face significant challenges in providing advice to their counterparts in the 
host nation, whether military or civilian, due to uncertainties regarding the 
parameters of the advisory relationship or the specific substance of particular 
exchanges. In missions where the role of rule of law advisor is such a critical 
one, the ambiguities and operational challenges set forth above loom large. 
When capacity building is at the heart of counterinsurgency efforts and 
 
 206 Volker Franke, The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil–Military Cooperation in Stability Operations, 11 
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stability operations—across a range of conflict situations—it is essential that 
actors on the ground be able to communicate effectively regarding the 
applicable legal framework and the obligations of the various actors involved, 
civilian or military, host nation or multinational. And yet it is here, in the one-
on-one relationships between advisor and host nation official, that ambiguities 
and uncertainties crop up time and again, leading to continued requests for 
further guidance from training and analysis centers back in the United States. 
Multinational operations can manifest more complex challenges in this 
area. In Afghanistan, the ISAF force includes troops from many different 
nations, many of whom focus their operations on capacity building.207 If these 
different contingents characterize the overall situation differently, they will 
thus have varying parameters for the provision of training and capacity 
building and for the content of such programs. The distinction between the 
U.S. view and the pre-2010 German view in Afghanistan offers a useful 
example: “U.S. forces conduct practical training for the Afghan army in real 
combat situations,” but such training fell “outside the German mandate.”208 In 
contrast, German forces at first applied police training methods relevant to 
domestic law enforcement activities.209 Although both types of training were 
useful and important, the clash in perspectives reduced the ability to engage in 
joint operations and joint decision-making on these issues. 
D. Third State Responsibilities 
International armed conflicts trigger the law of neutrality, which delineates 
the boundaries between the battlespace and neutral space, on which no fighting 
between belligerents may take place. The law of neutrality “defines the 
relationship under international law between states engaged in an armed 
conflict and those that are not participating in that armed conflict.”210 Based on 
 
 207 See Troop Numbers and Contribution, AFG. INT’L SECURITY FORCE, http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-
numbers-and-contributions/index.php (last visited May 5, 2012). “Capacity development is the process by 
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31, 2006, Definition of Basic Concepts and Terminologies in Governance and Public Administration: Note by 
the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. E/C.16/2006/4 (Jan. 5, 2006). 
 208 James D. Bindenagel, Afghanistan: The German Factor, PRISM, Sept. 4, 2010, at 95, 107. 
 209 Id. 
 210 U.K. MANUAL, supra note 39, ¶ 1.42; see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-
DEFENSE 25–26 (2001) (“The laws of neutrality are operative only as long as the neutral State retains its 
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the fundamental principle that neutral territory is inviolable,211 neutrality law 
seeks to (1) contain the spread of hostilities, particularly by keeping down the 
number of participants; (2) define the legal rights of parties and nonparties to 
the conflict; and (3) limit the impact of war on nonparticipants, especially with 
regard to commerce.212 Neutrality law thus leads to a geography-based 
framework in which belligerents can fight on belligerent territory or the 
commons but must refrain from any operations on neutral territory. This 
framework protects third states that are neutral from becoming part of the 
battleground of the armed conflict and prevents them from supporting any 
party to the armed conflict. 
The Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and 
Persons in Case of War on Land of 1907 (“Hague V”) sets forth neutrality 
law’s basic principles. Beyond upholding the inviolability of neutral territory, 
Hague V prohibits the movement of belligerent troops or materiel across 
neutral territory213 and the use of military installations or communications 
facilities on neutral territory.214 In addition, belligerent states may not attack 
targets in neutral territory, unless, as stated below, the neutral state fails to 
ensure its territory is not used for belligerent purposes. For its part, a neutral 
power must not provide, or enable the provision of, military supplies to any 
belligerent, nor allow its territory to be used for military operations.215 Indeed, 
it may use force—as necessary and within its capability—to prevent 
belligerent powers from using its territory for war-making purposes.216 To the 
extent a neutral state is unable or unwilling to prevent the use of its territory for 
such purposes, “a belligerent state may become entitled to use force in self-
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defence against enemy forces operating from the territory of that neutral state,” 
based on the ordinary rules governing the resort to force.217 As a companion to 
Hague V, the Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers 
in Naval War of 1907 (“Hague XIII”) sets forth principles of neutrality law for 
conflicts at sea.218 
In non-international armed conflicts, however, the law of neutrality does 
not apply.219 Third states may lawfully support a state against a non-state actor, 
thus becoming party to the existing non-international armed conflict220—like 
the United States in Afghanistan, for example. In contrast, third state support 
for a non-state actor against a state violates the general international law 
principle of nonintervention.221 Depending on the third state’s support or 
control of the non-state actor, the third state may, through its support of the 
non-state actor, commit an armed attack against the state or incur responsibility 
for the actions of the non-state actor.222 Alternatively, the nature and extent of 
such third-state support for a non-state actor may also result in an international 
armed conflict, such as in the former Yugoslavia.223 The principle of non-
intervention also remains in effect in non-conflict situations.224 
In today’s interconnected world, understanding the role of third states and 
external actors is a critical piece of the puzzle. Military and civilian actors on 
the ground in a conflict situation, peace operation, or other situation cannot 
operate in a vacuum but rather must take into account the actions of third states 
and external actors. To do so, they need a clear understanding of the applicable 
legal framework that guides the behavior of such actors and sets out 
parameters for the involvement in any conflict or non-conflict operation. 
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III.  THE WAY FORWARD 
This Article focuses on two fundamental issues endemic to today’s 
operations, as well as many past military operations: characterization of the 
conflict/non-conflict situation and the operational challenges on the ground 
that can arise in the face of uncertain or differing characterizations. Military 
and civilian actors on the ground in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans, and a range 
of other hotspots have addressed these issues with grace and adept analysis 
over the years, but ambiguities continue to arise and pose challenges time and 
again. When coupled with the range of strategic and policy issues underlying 
conflict characterization, the above discussion demonstrates that these 
normative issues do indeed make a real difference. Clear and consistent 
characterization of conflict certainly could help alleviate some of the 
challenges noted throughout this Article. However, as noted in the analysis of 
the strategic and policy considerations in Part I, policymakers have significant 
incentives to maintain flexibility in most situations. It is therefore essential to 
understand the consequences of such flexibility at the operational level and 
recognize that uncertainties and ambiguities may well remain, given the 
complicated nature of modern peace and stability operations, conflicts, and 
counterinsurgency operations. Minimizing both the ambiguities and their 
effects through training, tailored operational planning, and other resources will 
then be a crucial goal for both military and civilian actors at home and in the 
field. 
 
